A Free Trade Agreement between the United States and Mexico: The Right Choice by Silva, Jesus & Dunn, Richard K.
San Diego Law Review 
Volume 27 
Issue 4 Immigration and Nationality XV and 
Pacific Rim Symposiums 
Article 7 
11-1-1999 
A Free Trade Agreement between the United States and Mexico: 
The Right Choice 
Jesus Silva 
Richard K. Dunn 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr 
 Part of the Law of the Sea Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jesus Silva & Richard K. Dunn, A Free Trade Agreement between the United States and Mexico: The Right 
Choice, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 937 (1990). 
Available at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr/vol27/iss4/7 
This Pacific Ram / Law of the Sea is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Digital 
USD. It has been accepted for inclusion in San Diego Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital USD. For more 
information, please contact digital@sandiego.edu. 
A Free Trade Agreement Between The






I. THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT ........................................ 939
A. What is a Free Trade Agreement? ................................ 939
B. Impetus for the Free Trade Agreement ........................... 941
II. HISTORICAL MEXICAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS FOREIGN INVESTMENT ........ 945
A. Pre-Constitution (before 1917) ................................... 945
B. The Mexican Constitution ....................................... 948
C. Protectionism after the Constitution .............................. 951
D. Changes Opening Mexico to Foreign Investment .................... 953
III. MAJOR STEPS To ATTRACT FOREIGN INVESTMENT ............................ 955
A. The Maquiladora Industry ...................................... 956
* Copyright 1990 Jesus Silva & Richard K. Dunn.
** Jesus Silva, born Mexico City, 1948; J.D. National Autonomous University of
Mexico (U.N.A.M.), 1971; M.A. U.N.A.M., Public Finance, 1977; M.C.J. New York
University, 1981. Worked for PEMEX, the Mexican national oil company in Mexico and
New York for five years in charge of the legal aspects of international financing con-
tracts, and in Tokyo for five years in charge of negotiations of financial agreements and
the legal matters of PEMEX activities in Japan.
Practiced tax, corporate, banking and commercial law in Mexico City for six years and
spent four years in the U.S.-Mexico border area doing corporate, foreign investment, and
real estate law. Currently, legal and business consultant for foreign investors in Mexico,
of counsel attorney for Harrison & Dunn, Attorneys at Law in San Diego, California,
and Vice President of Benimex International, San Diego, California. I would like to
thank my wife, Mariko, for her patience and support during the creation of this Article.
*** Richard K. Dunn, B.A. Brigham Young University, International Relations,
Spanish, 1987; J.D. University of San Diego, 1990. Currently a partner at Harrison &
Dunn, Attorneys at Law in San Diego, California, working with international business,
investment, and immigration law. He is also a partner in a Mexican corporation special-
izing in trans-border trade and investment with Mexico.
1. The Maquiladora Law of 1989 ........................... 959
B. The New Foreign Investment Regulations of May 16, 1989 .......... 959
1. The Impact of the 1989 Regulations ........................ 960
2. The Weaknesses of the 1989 Regulations ...................... 964
3. The Government's Plans to Further Liberalize Foreign Investment, 967
IV. OTHER MEASURES AND CHANGES To LURE FOREIGN INVESTMENT To MEXICO 968
A. Changes in Foreign Investment Policy ............................. 968
1. The Privatization of Public Enterprises ........................ 968
2. Controlling the Value of the Peso ........................... 969
3. Changes in the Tax System ................................ 969
4. The Restructure of Debt Payments ......................... 969
5. Efforts to Curb Drug Trafficking and Corruption ............... 970
6. The Privatization of Mexican Banks ......................... 970
B. New Trade Promotion Measures to Open Mexico to Foreign Investment
and the FTA ................................................ 971
1. External Trade Measures (Reduction of Tariffs, etc.) ............ 971
2. Changes to Copyright, Trademark, Patent, and Immigration Law . 971
3. Other Agreements to Promote Trade .......................... 972
V. ANALYSIS OF THE NEED FOR AN FTA ............................ 973
A. The Types of Investments to be Generated by the FTA .............. 973
B. Why America Needs the FTA ................................. 974
C. Why Mexico Needs an FTA: The Turning Point .................. 978
VI. JAPAN AND OTHER COUNTRIES' REACTION To THE FTA AND RECENT
CHANGES IN M EXICO ............................................... 980
VII. THE SCOPE AND APPLICATION OF THE FTA ........................... 983
VIII. OBSTACLES To THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT .......................... 984
A. American Labor and Agriculture ............................. 985
B. Mexican Labor and Agriculture ............................... 986
C. Mexico's Political Obstacles to the FTA .......................... 988
D. Timing: Why so Fast? ...................... ................... 990
IX. CONCLUSION ....................................................... 991
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this Article is to demonstrate that the intended
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the United States and Mex-
ico is a natural and necessary step in the two countries' economic
relations. The past seventy years of economic policies between Mex-
ico and the United States have not anticipated such an alliance; yet,
due to worldwide and internal changes in both countries, the move to
align through the FTA seems both logical and compelled. Therefore,
by both natural force and more recently by design, the steps needed
for the pact are almost complete. Although it will have permanent
consequences and potential obstacles, the agreement must be imple-
mented now, and with some degree of haste. This Article will trace
the steps which have led to the FTA and will analyze the evolution
and progression of Mexican economic, legal, and political policies
which have now reached a point which permits and necessitates a
trade pact.
To examine the issues, steps, and problems inherent in a United
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States/Mexico trade alliance, this Article must discuss broadly re-
lated concepts. Part I generally analyzes the formation of the FTA
as well as the reasons for it. Part II briefly presents Mexico's history,
which is essential to understand the concerns and obstacles to such
an agreement. A review of Mexico's history is necessary to under-
stand how much of an aversion the FTA is to certain sectors in Mex-
ico. A historic perspective also helps to bring into focus the dramatic
change which Mexico has recently made to allow greater foreign
presence. Recently, much of the basic framework of the Mexican
Constitution has unwittingly evolved to tolerate more and more for-
eign presence. Part III presents the recent programs Mexico has im-
plemented to attract foreign investment and to make it more recep-
tive to the FTA. Part IV discusses more specifically the steps that
Mexico has taken to create confidence in both its economy and its
political structure. These steps have been designed to convince for-
eign investors that their money will be safe. Part V analyzes both the
need for an FTA, and the benefits it should generate. Part VI ad-
dresses how other nations, specifically Japan, are responding to the
recent economic changes in Mexico. Part VII briefly discusses the
scope and application of the FTA. And, finally, Part VIII analyzes
the potential obstacles to the FTA.
I. THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
Is there a tangible benefit for America in sharing the economic
fate of a diverse country such as Mexico? How can the FTA help
Mexico's economy? What are the reasons for the agreement? How
does an FTA make the nations involved become more prosperous?
This section analyzes these basic queries.
A. What is a Free Trade Agreement?
Pursuant to the theories of comparative costs (or advantages) of
Ricardo and Mill, whereby countries benefit more by producing the
types of commodities that are intrinsically (considering population,
geography, climates, etc.) more efficient to produce, international
trade has increased.' The corresponding principles of free trade asso-
ciated with these theories have been sustained by the democratic
countries, especially after World War 11.2 A free trade agreement is
1. P. SAMUELSON, EcONOMIcs 626-36 (1980).
2. This point is demonstrated principally by the emergence of GATT, General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (1947). For an overview of the
based upon the unrestricted international exchange of goods, with
tariffs used only as a source of revenue, not as an instrument to in-
fluence the quantity, direction, or price of goods.3 Thus, an FTA im-
poses no artificial control over the import or export of goods to ma-
nipulate the market; it lets the theory of comparative costs operate
freely.
A free trade pact between the United States and Mexico, like the
agreement reached by the United States and Canada,4 should be
viewed not only as a classic example of free trade, but also as a
defensive reaction to the creation of other trade blocks in other parts
of the world.5 Further, the pact is a natural step in the progression of
western hemisphere economics.6
This progression is manifested in the intended integration of the
American, Mexican, and Canadian markets. On February 5, 1991,
President Bush announced the intent to create a tri-lateral trade
agreement among the United States, Mexico, and Canada.7 This in-
tention was also announced by President Salinas of Mexico and
Prime Minister Mulroney of Canada.' The integration of the three
North American economies would create the most powerful eco-
nomic zone in the world.9
A tri-lateral approach to North American trade should not mate-
rially affect trade between the United States and Mexico specifically.
The time schedule of the agreement should not be altered because of
GATT, see generally 0. LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT MULTILAT-
ERAL TRADE SYSTEM (1985).
3. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 907 (3d ed. 1981); see also
PARR & GRANT, ENCYCLOPEDIA DICTnONARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 137 (1st ed.
1986); HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS, at 8, 9 (J. Walter/Murray 2d ed.
1988).
4. United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988,
Pub. L. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2112 (1988). See
also generally H. CROOKELL, CANADIAN-AMERICAN TRADE AND INVESTMENT UNDER
THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (1990).
5. Poll Shows U.S. Support for Extension of U.S.-Canada Trade Pact to Include
Mexico, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 848 (June 13, 1990). See also Longworth, World
Trade System Won't be the Same after Failure of GATT Talks, San Diego Union, Dec.
9, 1990, at A2. Principal examples of these blocks would include the European Economic
Community (EEC), ASEAN (among Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Ko-
rea, Thailand, and Taiwan), Latin American Free Trade Associations (LAFTA), and
various smaller trade alliances in the Caribbean and Africa.
6. Free Trade Agreement Endorsed, 7 Int'l. Trade Rep. (BNA) 1002 (July 4,
1990).
7. Truell, U.S., Canada, and Mexico to Negotiate a North American Free-Trade
Pact, Wall St. J., Feb. 6, 1991, at A7, col. 1.
8. Id.
9. See Halverson, Global Changes Forge New Economic Ties, Christian Science
Monitor, Apr. 30, 1990, at 9; Kaslow, Salinas Wants Labor Mobility, Christian Science
Monitor, June 15, 1990, at 9, col. 1; North American Free Trade Zone Would Top EC
in Population, Output, Mexican Official Says, 8 Int'l. Trade Rep. (BNA) 51 (Jan. 9,
1991).
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Canada's participation. 10 The prior free trade agreement between
the United States and Canada will most likely be used as a starting
point for the United States/Mexico/Canada negotiations; it is be-
lieved that a greater liberalization can be achieved through creating
a North American Trade Area than could be achieved in a bi-lateral
negotiation." The resulting tri-lateral agreement would be the first
step towards integrating all nations of the western hemisphere into a
single common market,' 2 consistent with President Bush's announce-
ment.'- Canada will obviously play a vital and indispensable role in
the negotiation of the tri-lateral free trade agreement. However, this
article will only focus on the relationship between the United States
and Mexico in regard to the FTA.
B. Impetus for the Free Trade Agreement
The reasons for the United States-Mexico Free Trade Agreement
are numerous and complex. From an objective point of view it is
apparent that certain global economic phenomena have affected al-
most every nation on earth. Advancing communication and transpor-
tation technologies have helped to open borders and stimulate inter-
national exchange. The resulting increase of foreign contact within
most nations has steadily affected social and political traditions in
many regions and has led to some compromise in the concept of sov-
ereignty as foreign cultures and ideas begin to permeate daily life. 4
Modern technological advances have also reduced the value that
many individuals give to the concepts of nationalism and patriotism,
especially when economic prosperity is at stake. Consequently, the
world has invented complicated economic entities such as trans-na-
10. Remarks by D. Abelson, Office of the United States Trade Representative, at a
public meeting on the U.S.-Mexico Free Trade negotiations, sponsored by the Institute
for Regional Studies of the Californias (San Diego State University) and the Depart-
ment of Transborder Affairs, County of San Diego (Feb. 7, 1991); see also, Hills Sees
No Delay if Canada Included, 7 Int'l. Trade Rep. (BNA) 1468 (Sept. 26, 1990); Trilat-
eral Negotiations Are Feasible, 7 Int'l. Trade Rep. (BNA) 1923 (Dec. 19, 1990).
11. Id.
12. S. Jenner, A Different Perspective on the Free Trade Agreement, Special Re-
port: Maquiladoras, Nov. 26, 1990, at 17 (reporting on a presentation by Don Abelson of
the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative). See also Truell, supra note 7.
13. See Truell, supra note 7. On February 5, 1991, President Bush announced his
desire to see an expanding western hemisphere free market, stating that the tri-lateral
agreement with Mexico and Canada would be a "dramatic first step to the realization of
a hemispheric free trade zone stretching from Point Barrow in Alaska to the Straits of
Magellan." Id.
14. See generally Nation-State: An Idea Under Siege, Wash. Post, Nov. 11, 1990,
at Al, col. 4.
tional corporations to seize available opportunities around the globe.
Thus, loyalties are increasingly being pledged to economic goals
rather than to traditions or sovereigns.'5
Recently, nations have demonstrated their increasing interdepen-
dence by forming trade blocks"6 to take advantage of these global
trends. Through a trade block, a nation can exploit its strength,
whether it be technology, capital, or labor, etc., and align with a
neighbor who has a complimentary strength. The result is a more
complex economic structure and a greater level of competition in the
world market. 17
Obviously, the United States and Mexico are not immune to the
effects of this global movement and the resulting heightened compe-
tition. The recent trade alliances create serious implications and
ramifications both in the United States and in Mexico and forces
both countries to reevaluate their ability to compete. As a result of
these reevaluations, the United States and Mexico must realize the
depth of their trade and economic interdependence 8 and see that
they can compliment each other and together offer a greater ability
for each to compete globally.' 9 Thus, to a great degree, an FTA
would serve as a defensive reaction to these natural economic move-
ments and as a mechanism to hedge against increasing world com-
petitiveness created by the formation of other trade blocks. 20
Because Mexico is also required to compete in the global arena, it
has reasons for wanting the FTA that go beyond a defensive reac-
tion. Mexico seeks the FTA because it has a compelling need for
investment capital and economic growth.2' As a rather young coun-
15. See generally, M. SILVA & B. SiOGREN, EUROPE 1992 AND THE NEW WORLD
POWER GAME 3-32 (1990).
16. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
17. "Win-Win" Situation, 7 Int'l. Trade Rep. (BNA) 1651 (Oct. 31, 1990); Fac-
ing Increased International Competition, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 122 (Jan. 23, 1991).
18. OFFICE or TRADE AND INVESTMENT ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T. OF COM., U.S. FOR-
EIGN TRADE HIGHLIGHTS 1989 46, 48 (1990). The Commerce Department's data states
that Mexico is the third highest purchaser of United State's products, with American
exports increasing from approximately $9 billion in 1983 to almost $25 billion in 1989.
Also, Mexico is the third highest supplier of American imports and the United State's
third highest total trade partner with combined trade of $52 billion in 1989. On the
Mexican side, the United States is Mexico's number one purchaser of exports and sup-
plier of imports. See MEXICO CITY NATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (CAMARA NA-
CIONAL DE COMERCIO DE LA CIUDAD DE MEXICO), MEXICO 1990: COMPENDIUM OF
DATA AND STATISTICS OF MEXICO (COMPENDIO DE DATos Y ESTADISTICAS DE MEXICO),
126 (1990).
19. See North American Free Trade Zone Would Top EC in Population, Output,
supra note 9, at 51.
20. See Facing Increased International Competition, supra note 17; Miller, Sali-
nas is Eager to Nail Down a Pact, L.A. Times, June 9, 1990, at A3, col. 4.
21. Mexico's labor force is one of the fastest growing of any major country, de-
manding the creation of one-million jobs a year. C. Salinas de Gortari, Address by the
President of Mexico, to a Joint House/Senate Meeting, 101st Cong. 1st Sess., 135 Cong.
Rec. H 6562, 6564 (Oct. 4, 1989) (Speech also published and reproduced by the Office
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try, Mexico has reached a position where its demographic growth is
competing against its economic development.22 Without the ability to
create economic growth and provide jobs. Mexico will be unable to
meet the needs of its expanding population because of a capital
shortage.3
Prior to Mexico's economic crisis of 198224 which was generated
mainly by the fall of oil prices,2 5 Mexico was able to balance eco-
nomic growth with population growth. This balance was reached by
receiving large amounts of financing from foreign sources.26 In the
years prior to 1982, Mexico had staked the majority of its economic
development on the oil industry,27 and thus, with the collapse of oil
prices in 1982,28 Mexico had no mechanism to maintain its growth
rate.2" Additionally, the indebtedness that was used to finance the oil
industry has recently become mature and payable and any capital
that could have been used to stimulate and modernize the economy,
is necessarily being used to service the immense debt.3 1 Conse-
quently, due to its exhausted ability to generate credit, Mexico must
seek growth through a new type of catalyst: foreign capital. In the
of the Press Secretary to the President of Mexico) [hereinafter Salinas Address]. Such a
high rate of growth demands that jobs be created. Capital is needed to provide these
jobs. In the past, Mexico depended largely on borrowed funds to promote growth; now,
however, that option is no longer viable, see infra notes and accompanying text. A Mexi-
can economic official confessed that Mexico had borrowed too much in the past and now
must seek a source of foreign capital to grow. See Rohatyn & Altman, Confront the
Mexico Problem, Wall St. J., Nov. 26, 1986, at A20, col 3; Green, Mexicans Divided on
Benefits of U.S. Trade Deal, J. Com. & Commercial, Nov. 15, 1989, at 5A, ol. 1. The
new investment liberalizations recently enacted in Mexico, see infra, demonstrate that
Mexican economic policy is to pursue foreign capital and investments. See Financial
Services May Open Later, 6 Int'l. Trade Rep. (BNA) 707, 708 (May 31, 1989); Moffett,
Japanese Investors Tread Warily in Mexico, Wall St. J., Nov. 1, 1989, at A8, col. 1.
22. This proposition is especially evident in regard to agricultural output. See R.
Salinas de Gortari, Mexican Agriculture in regard to the Challenge of Modernization
(El Campo Mexicano ante el reto de la Modernizacion), 40 Foreign Commerce (Com-
mercio Exterior) 827 (Sept. 1990).
23. See supra note 21.
24. A. RIDING, DISTANT NEIGHBORS 63-65 (1989).
25. Id. at 64. For an analysis of the crisis and its origins, see MExIco 2000, infra
note 44, at 33-41.
26. L. Meyer, Oil Booms and the Mexican Historical Experience: Past Problems-
Future Prospects, in MExIco-US. RELATIONS: CONFLICT AND CONVERGENCE 177, 181
(C. Vasquez & M. Griego eds. 1983).
27. See A. RIDING, supra note 24, at 165.
28. Id. at 64.
29. See generally L. Meyer, supra note 26.
30. See generally WEINTRAUB, A MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE: RELATIONS BE-
TWEEN MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES 12, 13, 132-33 (1990); Castaneda, The
Choices Facing Mexico, in MEXICO IN TRANSITION 18, 19 (1988).
current scenario without borrowing, this capital will have to come
from increased trade and international investment.31
Furthermore, in addition to creating domestic problems in Mexico,
the shortage of capital and inability to create jobs directly affects the
United States and, consequently, the United States has a legitimate
interest in Mexico's ability to provide employment. 32 In a declining
Mexican economy, wages would fall, illegal immigration to the
United States would rise, and the size of Mexico's market for Amer-
ican products would diminish.33 To combat these undesirable effects,
a logical solution for both the United States and Mexico would be to
align economically by opening the door of free trade, allowing an
influx of capital into Mexico, thereby fostering growth and curbing
illegal immigration. Moreover, an alignment through free trade
should have additional benefits to both the United States and Mex-
ico beyond creating jobs and curbing illegal immigration. These ben-
efits will be discussed at a later point.34
However, from the Mexican perspective, an alliance with the
United States may not be the only available alternative to win for-
eign capital. Prior to discussing the FTA with the United States,
Mexico attempted to attract other types of foreign investment capi-
tal. Initially, efforts were made by Mexico's administration to attract
foreign investment indiscriminately from many sources as sights
were not solely fixed on the United States and American capital.3
Indeed, Mexico's administration specifically sought to attract capital
from Japan and Europe rather than from the United States. This is
demonstrated by trips taken by Mexico's President Salinas to Japan
and Europe in the spring of 1989 to find investors.3 6 Immediately
following his trips to Japan and Europe, President Salinas decided to
follow-up on the United State's ongoing proposals37 to enter into a
free trade type of alliance. The less than successful trips to Japan
and Europe, in conjunction with the present global situation of devel-
oping trade blocks, made the FTA seem more plausible. Only then,
after six weeks of rumor and innuendo that an FTA was being nego-
tiated,38 did President Salinas fully commit to the possibility of a
31. Mexico: The New Model Debtor, ECONOMIST, Oct. 6, 1990, at 86.
32. See infra notes 231-33 and accompanying text.
33. R. Dunn, Low-Paid Workers Would Lose Even More in Free-Trade Pact With
Mexico, Wash. Post, Aug. 1, 1990, at F3, col. 1.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 222-37.
35. Brisson, U.S.-Mexico Trade Continues to Expand and Improve, Bus, AM.,
Dec. 4, 1989, at 7, 8.
36. See Kaslow, supra note 9.
37. A. RIDING, supra note 24, at 335; A. PASTOR & J. CASTANEDA, LIMITS TO
FRIENDSmP, 239 (1988); House Agriculture Committee's De la Garza Presses Mexico
to Study Broad Trade Accord, 6 Int'l. Trade Rep. (BNA) 239 (Feb. 22, 1989).
38. U.S. Seen Giving "Warm Reception" to Mexican Request for Talks on FTA,
7 Int'l. Trade Rep. (BNA) 736 (May 23, 1990).
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free trade pact with the United States.3 9 Subsequently, experts in
Mexican-American economic relations began to voice divergent opin-
ions on the issue.40 However, as the realities of heightened competi-
tion and need for economic growth peaked, the possibility of a North
American trade agreement began to materialize.4'
II. HISTORICAL MEXICAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS FOREIGN
INVESTMENT
Although the FTA may help to solve Mexico's economic problems,
many factions oppose it. Emerging political parties in Mexico oppose
opening Mexico's economy to foreign investment.42 This reaction
may be reasonable in light of unfortunate passages of Mexican his-
tory. Prior colonizations, interventions, and economic exploitations in
Mexico by foreigners are not easily forgotten by the Mexican people.
Therefore, because of Mexico's historic distrust of its northern
neighbor, many questions and problems will arise if Mexico commits
to such a permanent relationship. To realize the source and extent of
this distrust from a nationalistic Mexican perspective it is necessary
to understand the historical events which have produced hostility to-
wards foreign presence.
A. Pre-Constitution (before 1917)
Throughout its modern history, Mexico has often been subjected
to foreign intervention. Intervention began when the Spaniard,
Hernan Cortez, first arrived at Mexico's shores in 1519. Violent
clashes between the Spaniards and native Mexicans set the tempo
for what much of Mexican life would be for the next few hundred
years.43
Mexico was formed as a self-governing country by native indians
39. Bush and Mexican President Salinas Agree to Move Toward Free Trade
Agreement, 7 Int'l. Trade Rep. (BNA) 834 (June 13, 1990).
40. Compare FTA Between Mexico and United States Will Boost Export Oppor-
tunities, Study Finds, 8 Int'l. Trade Rep. (BNA) 357 (Mar. 6, 1991) and Key Legisla-
tors Urge Bush Not to Limit Agenda in FTA Negotiations with Mexico, 8 Int'l. Trade
Rep. (BNA) 19 (Jan. 2, 1991). The reports by independent officials support many diver-
gent opinions regarding the benefits that an FTA would bestow.
41. SPECIAL FORM No. 1 (INFORME ESPECIAL), BANCOMEXT, Aug. 1990, at 1.
42. See R. Rubio, Mexico in Perspective: An Essay on Mexico's Economic Re-form and the Political Consequences, 12 Hous. J. INT'L. L. 239 (1990); Davison, Salinas
gets silent treatment, San Diego Union, Nov. 2, 1989, at Al, col. 2; Silver, Mexico has
its own Reform Movement-Salinastroika, San Diego Union, Oct. 21, 1990, at C5, col. 1.
See also infra p. 82-92.
43. See generally, A. RIDING, supra note 24, at 29-34.
and Christian subjects of the king of Spain. The majority of these
people shared a heritage of both indian and Spanish blood and were
called mestizos. The mestizos did not share the values of the Span-
ish. Instead, as a result of domination by Spanish landowners and
employers, the mestizos grew to distrust the Spanish, and identified
them with exploitation and unfairness.4
As a result of this exploitation and resentment, Mexico rebelled
against three hundred years of Spanish domination on September 15,
1810, with Father Miguel Hidalgo's cry for revolution against Spain.
This was the first of Mexico's many attempts to shed the yoke of
foreign manipulation and subjugation.45
Later, after Mexico had won its independence from Spain, France
invaded Mexico, and in 1864 Napoleon III placed a stranger, Maxi-
milian, on the Mexican throne. This French intervention pushed
Mexico into another civil war where Mexicans fought to rid them-
selves of French dominion and a non-Mexican ruler.4
However, in the minds of many Mexicans, the most acrid and ve-
hement violations of sovereignty came at the hands of the United
States. Many Mexicans have always feared that threats from the
colossus to the north would be imminent.47 The threats and actions
of the United States have taken Mexican land, terminated Mexican
lives, dominated Mexican politics and culture, and guarded Mexican
autonomy. These violations have subsequently become ingrained in
the Mexican mind as an integral part of their history.
In 1836, fifteen years after Mexico's independence from Spain,
American settlers in the Texas territory rebelled against Mexican
authority.48 After battles such as the Alamo and Goliad, 4' Texans
declared their independence from Mexico.50 Within ten years after
this declaration, the United States annexed Texas as a state, and
declared war in response to Mexican challenge (Mexico was still
claiming Texas as a territory) 1
During the war, American forces captured Mexico City in Decem-
ber 1847. Mexico was compelled to surrender and to drop any claims
to Texas.52 Further, the United States demanded Mexico's northern
territories. These additional demands, as expressed in the Treaty of
44. J. WANNISKI, MExico 2000 at 17-20 (1990).
45. Id.
46. Peck, Mexico and the U.S.: A History of Suspicion and Friendship, SCHO-
LASTIC UPDATE, Nov. 18, 1988 at 16.
47. See generally, A. PASTOR & J. CASTANEDA, supra note 37, at 39-77.
48. Id.
49. J. CROW, THE EPic OF LATIN AMERICA, at 653-55 (1980).
50. See Peck & Eskin, Remember Which Alamo?, SCHOLASTIC UPDATE, Nov. 18,
1988, at 18.
51. Id. See also J. CROW, supra note 49, at 655-57; A. RIDINr, supra note 24, at
36.
52. J. CROW, supra note 49, at 657-59.
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Guadalupe in 1848, 53 required Mexico to sell off close to one-half of
its total land mass, including what is now California, Arizona, Ne-
vada, New Mexico, and Utah, for the paltry sum of 15 million
dollars.5 4
As a result of this American invasion, Mexicans have passed sto-
ries on to subsequent generations to demonstrate the great anti-
American emotions that Mexico felt. One of these accounts is of
"Los Ninos Heroes" (Heroic Children), where several young men, to
avoid the ravages of an American incursion into Mexico City led by
General Winfield Scott, wrapped themselves in the Mexican flag and
threw themselves down from a lofty fortress.5 5 This act is today com-
memorated by a large monument in Mexico City and the story is
taught to elementary students as an important part of Mexican his-
tory demonstrating how one should feel for Mexico.
The 1847 invasion of Mexico City was not an isolated incident.
The United States invaded Mexico during the period of the Mexican
Revolution from 1911 to 1917. During this period, United States
President Woodrow Wilson sent troops to Mexico to prevent a cer-
tain "undesirable" anti-American general from taking control of the
country. During this invasion, American Marines occupied the Ports
of Tampico and Veracruz in an effort to halt ammunition deliveries
to the wrong Mexican revolutionaries .5
Angered by President Wilson's interference, Pancho Villa, an infa-
mous rebel leader, crossed into the United States and killed eighteen
Americans. In response to Villa's actions, General John J. Pershing
was sent into Mexico by President Wilson. In 1916 General Pershing
led 10,000 troops on a retaliatory expedition deep into Mexico to
capture Villa. 7
Moreover, further hostility towards Americans resulted from the
association of Americans with favors given by Mexico's most de-
spised dictator, Porfirio Diaz. Through thirty-four years of oppres-
sion (1884-1910) Porfirio Diaz alienated both himself and foreigners
from the Mexican people. He granted favors to foreigners by selling
them prime business opportunities, while he strangled his own people
with oppression and injustices. This oppression linked the hate and
53. Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, Feb. 2, 1848, United States-Mexico, 9 Stat. 922
at art. V; see also A. RIDING, supra note 24, at 36.
54. A. RIDING, supra note 24, at 36. See also, Peck, supra note 46, at 16.
55. J. CROW, supra note 49, at 657-58.
56. See generally Peck, supra note 46, at 17, and J. CROW, supra note 49, at 690-
91.
57. See Peck, supra note 46, at 17.
inequities of the dictatorship to the Americans, since Americans
profited from the special treatment. 58 During the tenure of Porfirio
Diaz, Mexico was known as the "mother of foreigners and the step-
mother of her own children".5 9
Additionally, Mexico has been subjected to determinism and eco-
nomic manipulation by America. 0 Hard nosed dollar diplomacy was
used to exploit Mexico's economy.61 American businessmen with
large interests in Mexican land, oil, and agriculture effectively pre-
cluded bright points of the Mexican economy from being enjoyed by
Mexicans. 2
To an extremely patriotic nation these invasions over the years
have made Mexicans wary of Yankee exploitation. 63 Mexico per-
ceives its foreign relations with the U.S. as a permanent relationship
of interference.6 4 This perception helped lay the foundation for Mex-
ico's strong anti-foreigner Constitution drafted in 1917.65 Much of
the popular acceptance of this supreme document resulted from the
portion of its text which controls and eliminates rights and opportu-
nities for foreigners.66 This anti-foreigner position was likely caused
by the United States' earlier interference with the ideals and leader-
ship of the Mexican Revolution. Many of the leaders who were af-
fected by the United State's interference were later instrumental in
drafting Mexico's Constitution. Moreover, these anti-foreign atti-
tudes were not only adopted by the very nationalistic and influential
people, but were also demanded by the Mexican populace which had
suffered in one way or another under the influence of foreigners.
These strict constitutional measures to regulate foreigners were
deemed necessary and aimed to remedy the threat of future breaches
of economic and territorial sovereignty. Many of these attitudes still
persist today, and have been the basis of Mexican politics over the
past seventy or more years.
B. The Mexican Constitution
The Mexican Constitution, written in 1917, became a pioneer in
the world of social proclamations because it was the child of dra-
matic social and economic conditions of the past. Through historical
58. See generally J. CROW, supra note 49, at 669-74.
59. See Peck supra note 46, at 17.
60. A. PASTOR & J. CASTANEDA, supra note 37, at 55-77.
61. Peck, supra note 46, at 16.
62. See id., at 17.
63. See Work & Bussey, Bievenidos To A Fire Sale, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD
REPORT, Oct. 16, 1989, 96, 100.
64. See generally, A. PASTOR & J. CASTANEDA, supra note 37, at 55-77.
65. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE MEXICO (CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES OF MEXICO) (MEXICO) [hereinafter CONST.]
66. See infra notes 67-83 and accompanying text.
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introspection it is evident that the social and economic problems in
Mexico, especially during the Mexican Revolution, greatly influ-
enced this fundamental charter. Along with provisions relating to the
State's structure and functions, chapters were specifically included in
the Constitution to resolve the problems of inequality and exploita-
tion by the church and the threat of all types of invasions by
foreigners.
The most important examples of these provisions are found in Ar-
ticles 2767 and 12368 of the Constitution. These Articles were
designed to exert control over the most troubled aspects of the coun-
try's economy: land and labor. Article 27 declares that "ownership of
the lands and waters . . . is vested in the nation" and gives the na-
tion the right to regulate the use of national resources in order to
preserve and ensure a more equitable distribution of public wealth.6 9
Section I of the same Article further provides that "only Mexicans
...have the right to acquire ownership of lands, waters and their
appurtenances. 170 The State may grant the same ownership right to
foreigners only if they consider themselves as nationals in respect to
such property and promise not to invoke the protection of their gov-
ernments at penalty of forfeiting the property.
7 1
Moreover, Article 27 bans foreign ownership within a zone of one
hundred kilometers along the borders and of fifty kilometers along
the shores.72 It also restricts ownership of lands by religious institu-
tions and even confiscated such lands in their possession at that time.
Further, all corporations with any foreign capital were impeded from
acquiring agricultural properties. As a vindication of prior domin-
ions, Mexico, at the time of the Constitution, seized ownership of all
67. CONST., at ch. I, art. 27.
68. Id. at tit. VI, art. 123.
69. "The nation shall at all times have ... the right to regulate the utilization of
national resources ... in order to preserve them and ensure that there is a more equita-
ble distribution of public wealth." Id. at ch. I, art. 27.
70. Id. at ch. I, art. 27, § I.
71.
The state may grant the same right to foreigners [to acquire ownership of
lands, waters, and their appurtenances], provided they agree ... to consider
themselves as nationals in respect to such property, and-bind themselves not to
invoke the protection of their governments in matters relating these to, under
penalty, in case of noncompliance with this agreement, of forfeiture of the ac-
quired property to the nation.
Id.
72. "Under no circumstances may foreigners acquire direct ownership of lands or
waters within a zone of one hundred kilometers along the frontiers and of fifty kilometers
along the shores of the country." Id.
subterranean land for itself, including all subsoils, waters, gases,
minerals, and hydrocarbons.7 3
In the area of labor, Article 123 set limits on the rampant tradi-
tional exploitation of human resources; and, in that context, estab-
lished minimum legal safeguards to protect every Mexican worker.74
This elaborate article sets guidelines on maximum working hours,
minimum age and wages, working conditions, and employers respon-
sibilities. It gives workers the right to participate in profit sharing,
and to form unions and associations to organize strikes and lockouts.
Finally, as a blanket protection, Article 123 generally prohibits
waiver of these constitutional rights.
Additionally, Articles were established to protect Mexico from
foreigners in general.76 Only citizens of Mexico have the right to
assemble, associate, or take part in the political affairs of the coun-
try. 77 These limitations are so important that they are reiterated
twice in the Constitution by two separate articles.7 8 Moreover, Mexi-
can citizens have "priority over foreigners under equality of circum-
stances for all classes of concessions and for all employment, posi-
tions, or commissions of the government. '79
The Constitution also bans the use of nobility titles that were
widely used earlier by the Spanish to discriminate and exert domin-
ion over those without titles, and the rendering of official services or
aid to foreign governments and individuals.8 0 Any breach of these
bans would result in revocation of Mexican citizenship.81 Even the
use or acceptance of foreign decorations without permission by the
Congress is included in this restriction. 2 Furthermore, to be presi-
dent of Mexico, a candidate must be a "Mexican citizen by birth
[not naturalization] . . . and the child of Mexican parents by
73. "In the case of petroleum, and solid, liquid, or gaseous hydrocarbons or radio-
active minerals, no concessions or contracts shall be granted nor may those that have
been granted continue, and the nation shall carry out the exploitation of these products."
Id. at ch. I, art. 27.
74. E.g., The maximum duration of work for one day is limited to eight hours, the
maximum duration for night work is limited to seven hours, and for every six continuous
days of work, a worker must have at least one day of rest. Id. at tit. VI, art. 123.
75. E.g., "[s]tipulations implying the waiving of any right designed to favor the
worker in the laws of protection and assistance for workers" are considered null and void
even if expressed in a contract. Id.
76. See generally id. at ch. I, art. 9, ch. III, art. 33.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at ch. III, art. 33. See also id. ch. I, arts. 5, 9, 12, ch. IV, art. 37, tit. VII,
art. 130 for similar applications.
80. "In the United States of Mexico nobility titles shall not be granted." Id. at ch.
I, art. 12.
81. Id. at ch. IV, art. 37, § B.
82. "Mexican nationality is forfeited ... [b]y accepting or using foreign decora-
tions without permission of the Federal Congress or of its Permanent Committee." Id. at
Fraction I.
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birth."s3
In many ways, the specific provisions limiting foreign involvement
in Mexico were more solidly drafted into the Constitution than the
provisions designed to establish the powers of the government
branches.8 4 Anti-foreign articles laid the ground for the nationaliza-
tion of foreign owned businesses. This was later exemplified in 1938
by the nationalization of United States and British oil companies for
their non-adherence to the Mexican Supreme Court's decision re-
garding the enforcement of Constitutional labor laws.""
Thus, through its Constitution, Mexico attempted to thwart future
foreign injustices and interventions. However, notwithstanding the
guarantees and safeguards found in the Constitution, Mexico's prior
experience of injustice and intervention has not been forgotten, and
today it still affects the hearts of Mexicans almost as much as it
affected Mexico's constitution. To present day Mexicans, articles
such as 27 and 123 have become symbols of legitimate self-gov-
erning victories over foreign intrusion, and are currently being
honored daily in every town and city. Most every Mexican commu-
nity has schools, auditoriums, hospitals, public squares, clubs, or
streets that are named after one of these articles. For example, a
main street in central Mexico City is named "Article 123," re-
minding Mexicans of the importance of the Constitutional labor
safeguards.
C. Protectionism after the Constitution
Following the enactment of the Constitution, Mexico continued to
take steps to protect its economy from foreign influences. One of
these steps was to protect its domestic industrial and agricultural
base. Import substitutions were the most important protective mea-
sure. These were first applied to goods for consumption and later to
intermediate and capital goods. Mexico implemented both tariff and
non-tariff barriers, such as import licenses, quotas, subsidies, tax
breaks, and credits for ailing industries."8 On the domestic side, tax
policies and public finance measures patriotically protected and pro-
moted local manufacturing. There was no intent or incentive by the
government to increase exports or to buy imports. As a result of such
83. Id. at tit. III, ch. II, art 82.
84. See generally text of CONST.; Gomez-Palacio, The New Regulation on Foreign
Investment in Mexico: A Difficult Task, 12 Hous. J. INT'L. LAW 255-56 (1990).
85. CONST. at tit. VI, art. 123. See also A. RIDING, supra note 24, at 54, 160-61.
86. A. PASTOR & J. CASTANEDA, supra note 37, at 231.
domestic subsidies, Mexico's industries became inefficient. Such inef-
ficiency led to expensive distribution and commercial channels
which, for many years, due to protectionism and trade restrictions,
did not have to deal with external competition.87
Consistently, as Mexico protected its domestic industrial base, it
also limited foreign investment.8 The first foreign investment protec-
tionism measures resulted from the Constitution, especially the en-
forcement of the articles on land and labor. Later, however, even
more restrictive rules were added to Article 27 of the Constitution.
For example, regulations to fraction I of Article 27, enacted in 1925,
limited foreign equity ownership to a maximum of fifty percent. 89
This enactment limited foreign equity in Mexican businesses, and
consequently made majority ownership by any foreigner illegal. Gen-
erally, the idea was to limit foreign ownership by making the con-
trols more and more detailed and restrictive.90 Thus, Mexico began
to use regulations to its Constitution as a tool for implementing fur-
ther control over foreign involvement.
This seemingly ad hoc and complicated set of rules emanating
from the Constitution focused mainly on limiting and preventing for-
eign ownership in restricted zones and activities. This policy was
strictly enforced until 1937, when Mexico's President Cardenas is-
sued an Executive Order authorizing the limited use of trusts to al-
low foreigners to use and receive benefit from real estate located
close to Mexico's borders and shores. 1
The 1937 executive order, combined with another in 1941,92 pro-
duced the final Executive Order by President Echeverria in 1971
which authorized the Ministry of Foreign Relations to issue permits
for Mexican banks to act as trustees for foreigners in the ownership
of real estate in the restricted zones.93 Through these trusts, a Mexi-
87. D. RONFELT & C. SERESERES, THE MANAGEMENT OF U.S.-MExIco INTERDE-
PENDENCE: DRIFT TOWARD FAILURE?, in MEXICAN-U.S. RELATIONS: CONFLICT AND
CONVERGENCE 43, 52 (C. Vasquez and M. Griego eds. 1983).
88. See S. WEINTRAUB. FREE TRADE BETWEEN MEXICO AND THE UNITED
STATES? (1984).
89. Organic Law of Fraction I of Article 27 of the General Constitution, OFFICIAL
GAzETTE (DIARIO OFICIAL), Jan. 21, 1926 [hereinafter D.O.].
90. For a list of these controls, see Regulations to the Organic Law of ch. I, art.
23, § 1 of the Mexican Const., D.O., Aug. 29, 1926. The term "Organic" is not precise in
this situation. The law would generally be entitled a regulatory law, not organic law,
since organic laws in Mexico have historically only been enacted to create regulatory
bodies. In this instance, no actual body was created, rather only a set of guidelines.
91. D.O., Nov. 22, 1937.
92. D.O., Aug. 6, 1941.
93. Presidential Accord that Authorizes the Ministry of Foreign Relations to
Grant National Credit Institutions the Permits to Acquire as Trustees the Dominion of
Real Estate Destined to Industrial and Tourism Activities in Borders and Coasts, D.O.,
Apr. 30, 1971 [hereinafter Fideicomiso]. The legal term for this type of trust is "Fide-
icomiso." The 1971 order was later elevated to the status of law. See infra notes 101-02,
108-09 and accompanying text. The "Fideicomiso" system was further modified by the
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can seller (trustor or settlor) conveys title to the bank, giving instruc-
tions that the foreign buyer (beneficiary) acquires all interests and
rights in the land, except for the title, for a maximum term of thirty
years. The main considerations for limiting complete foreign owner
were the attitudes of the original Constitutional Congress to defend
the country's sovereignty, and the federal government's unavoidible
duty to preserve the integrity of the nation's territory.94
In 1981, Mexico's gross national product grew 8.8 percent as a
result of oil reserve exports.95 Though impressive, this growth was
achieved by an abuse of domestic reserves, by relying too heavily
upon foreign credit, and by fixing loans to mature in the short term.
Notwithstanding this growth, in many regards Mexico retained its
protectionistic and isolationist position. Through the 1970s and early
1980s, Mexico kept a paternal attitude towards industry. During this
period, fearing a loss of control over its oil resources, Mexico re-
jected a proposal to form a North American common market.96 The
same reaction, under the pressure of Mexican entrepreneurs and un-
ions, resurfaced in 1981 when Mexico decided not to join the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) because of the "risk"
of exposing its own protected industries to foreign competition.9 7
D. Changes Opening Mexico to Foreign Investment
Though the Mexican government generally maintained its protec-
tionist attitude through 1988, some steps had been taken to allow
limited foreign investment. From 1938, when Mexico's President
Cardenas was in office, until December 1, 1988, when Carlos Salinas
de Gortari became President, government foreign investment policies
had, for the most part, not changed ostensibly. However, several pos-
Foreign Investment Regulations of May 16, 1989 which provided for an additional 30
year renewal of foreign ownership interest. Infra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the current "Fideicomiso" system see infra note 161 and accompany-
ing text. As a review, the restricted zones under this trust system are all lands located
within one-hundred kilometers of Mexico's borders and fifty kilometers of the shores. See
supra note 72.
94. Fideicomiso, D.O., Apr. 30, 1971, at preamble.
95. Mexico City National Chamber of Commerce, (CAMARA NACIONAL DE CO-
MERCIO DE LA CIUDAD DE MEXICO), MEXICO 1990: COMPENDIUM OF DATA AND STATIS-
TICS OF MEXICO (COMPENDIO DE DATOS Y ESTADISTICAS DE MEXICO), 54 (1990).
96. A. PASTOR & J. CASTANEDA, supra note 37, at 239. C. Rico, THE FUTURE OF
MEXICAN-U.S. RELATIONS AND THE LIMITS OF THE RHETORIC OF "INTERDEPENDENCE",
in MEXICAN-U.S. RELATIONS: CONFLICT AND CONVERGENCE 1127, 1129-40 (C. Vasquez
and M. Griego eds. 1983); S. WEINTRAUB, supra note 88, at 2.
97. A. RIDING, supra note 24, at 333. See generally S. WEINTRAUB, supra note 88,
at 84-91.
itive steps were taken in this period. Mexico first, in a very isolated
manner, tenuously relaxed its anti-foreign position in 1959 by al-
lowing the temporary importation of materials to be assembled in
Mexico and then reexported." This step in 1959 was the seed of the
Maquiladora concept which was further liberalized in 1966.11 The
Maquiladora program was the first mechanism since 1926, when for-
eign ownership was restricted to fifty percent, to allow 100 percent
foreign ownership of a Mexican company. 100
Mexico also relaxed its anti-foreign position through the enact-
ment of a foreign investment law in 1973.101 This law did not sub-
stantively change the ability of foreigners to invest in Mexico, but it
did demonstrate the Mexican government's renewed interest in for-
eign investment.
When the 1973 foreign investment law was enacted, the underly-
ing policy of controlling foreign investment was expressed in its title,
"Law to Promote Mexican Investment and to Regulate Foreign In-
vestment.110 2 This law established as a blanket rule, a forty-nine per-
cent equity limit on foreign participation in a Mexican industry.10 3
The main feature of the law was the creation of the National Com-
mission on Foreign Investment, which was given power to determine
the percentage of foreign equity participation allowed on a case by
case basis.10 4 The law established the criteria and requirements of
applications for ownership (based on legal provisions and regula-
tions) and the breakdown of criteria required to accept such invest-
ments in Mexico.'05 Interestingly, the law was written with the pur-
pose to "foster Latin American regional and subregional
integration," not to seek investment, and required that any foreign
investor respect the country's social and cultural values. 10 The Na-
tional Foreign Investment Registry was created to ensure these
ideologies.10 7
98. System of Temporary Imports and Exports, D.O., Oct. 3, 1958, at 1.
99. See Ministerial Letter 4132, from the Ministry of Industry and Commerce,
to the Ministry of Finance, D.O., June 20, 1966 [hereinafter Ministry Letter]. Issued
reciprocally by the Ministries of Finance and Industry and Commerce. For a discussion
of the Maquiladora program see infra notes 114-35 and accompanying text. However,
the Maquiladora law was not officially enacted until 1983. See Decree for the Develop-
ment and Operation of the Maquila Industry for Exportation, D.O., Aug. 15, 1983
[hereinafter Maquila Decree].
100. CONST., supra note 65, at ch. I, art. 27, fraction I. Article 27, fraction I
limited foreign ownership to 50%. See supra text accompanying note 89.
101. Law to Promote Mexican Investment and to Regulate Foreign Investment,
D.O., Mar. 9, 1973, at art. 3 [hereinafter Foreign Investment Law].
102. Id., ch. I, art. 1.
103. Id., ch. I. art. 5.
104. Id., ch. III, arts. 11, 12.
105. Id., art. 13.
106. Id., art. 13 at XVI, XVII.
107. Id., ch. V, at. 23.
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Subsequently, in 1975, the National Commission on Foreign In-
vestment began to issue administrative decisions which soon evolved
into general resolutions and legal precedents. Through this evolution,
the Commission began to legislate, and thus mold the limits on for-
eign investment. This legislation may have made the 1973 law's ap-
plication and understanding somewhat confusing to potential inves-
tors, but it did provide greater flexibility. Further, through the
foreign investment law, previous executive orders, specifically the
1971 Order 08 which granted Mexican banks the right to be trustees
for foreign ownership of restricted land, were finally elevated to the
category of law.109
These small number of changes in over fifty years were attempts
to develop Mexico's economy; however, at the time of President Sali-
nas' inauguration in 1988, the Maquiladoras and the other minor
foreign investment changes were not bringing enough real capital
into the country.110 Consequently, President Salinas decided that
Mexico required a major economic reform. 1
The first reform enacted by President Salinas was to attract capi-
tal through the new Foreign Investment Regulations of May 16,
1989 (Regulations). These Regulations have subsequently been
liberalized1 3 and have even been credited for opening the doors to
greater economic change in Mexico.
III. MAJOR STEPS To ATTRACT FOREIGN INVESTMENT
By looking at the volatile relationship between the United States
and Mexico, one sees that the FTA cannot be completely enacted in
108. Fideicomiso, D.O., Apr. 30, 1971 at 1. This Executive Order authorized the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to grant Mexican credit institutions permits to acquire the
ownership of real estate for foreigners as trustees for land destined to carry out activities
in industry or tourism in the border or shore areas (restricted zones). However, this was
only an Executive Order and not actually given status of law until the 1973 law was
enacted. See infra note 109.
109. Foreign Investment Law, D.O., Mar. 9, 1973, at ch. 4, arts. 18-21, p. 7.
110. The main purpose of the Maquiladora program was not created to bring capi-
tal into Mexico; rather, the program was established to provide jobs for Mexican work-
ers. Maquila Decree, D.O., Aug. 15, 1983. See discussion of this program and its func-
tion infra notes 114-35 and accompanying text. See also generally R. DAVIs, INDUSTRIA
MAQUILADORA Y SUBSIDIARIAs DE CO-INVERSION 12-23 (1985).
111. See generally, Salinas Address, supra note 21.
112. Regulations to the Foreign Investment law, D.O., May 16, 1989 [hereinafter
Regulations]. For a discussion of the May 16, 1989 regulations see infra notes 139-44
and accompanying text.
113. For examples of subsequent liberalizations, see infra notes 136, 164, 204 and
accompanying text.
one massive leap. Such an agreement will have grave impact on the
cultures and economies of both countries. This especially applies to
Mexico in that an FTA is completely opposed to many of Mexico's
historic economic policies. A slow and steady process of liberalizing
Mexico's anti-foreign restrictions was needed to position Mexico so
that the many factions in Mexico could accept the notion of free
trade with the United States. Over the past twenty-five years, this
process did occur. While effectively maintaining many protectionist
attitudes, Mexico, perhaps unwittingly, enacted various steps which,
when taken together, created the opportunity and foundation for an
FTA. These steps are analyzed below.
A. The Maquiladora Industry
The Maquiladora program, conceptualized in 1966,114 was devel-
oped fundamentally to generate employment, 15 and has become
Mexico's foreign exchange flagship. 1 6 Maquiladora (or a plant
which does industrial production known as a Maquila) is a legal
structure for a manufacturing program which allows foreigners to
import equipment, machinery, components, and materials duty free,
to produce, within certain limitations, goods in Mexico, provided
that a substantial percentage of such goods will be exported from
Mexico. 117 A Maquila can be completely owned by a Mexican na-
tional, foreigner, or by any corporation proved to be duly incorpo-
rated under Mexican law. 1 8 Most Maquiladoras are run as twin-
plants. Under a twin-plant framework, a company will establish two
entities, one on each side of the border. 19 Generally, the Mexican
based entity is a production plant used for the labor intensive parts
of production, while the United States based plant could be used for
other aspects of production, marketing, or distribution. Hence, a pro-
duction sharing concept is derived. 20
Originally, the 1983 law governing Maquiladoras required that
companies export eighty percent of all production.' 2' However, as of
December 22, 1989, new directives were outlined to allow up to fifty
114. See supra note 99.
115. Ministry Letter, D.O., June 20, 1966. The Maquiladora program was estab-
lished to compensate for agricultural jobs lost when the Bracero program was terminated
in 1965. The Bracero program allowed Mexicans to enter the U.S. and work in the agri-
cultural sector to fill a void made by the lack of available U.S. labor. See R. DAVIS,
supra note 110, at 21-22.
116. See infra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
117. Maquila Decree, D.O., Aug. 15, 1983, at ch. II, arts. 3, 7, 12.
118. Id. at art. 3.
119. A. PASTOR & J. CASTAREDA, supra note 37, at 225.
120. Teske, U.S. Trade with Mexico in Perspective, Bus. AM., June 18, 1990, at
20-21.
121. Maquila Decree, D.O., Aug. 15, 1983, at ch. II, art. 12. However, less than
eighty percent may be exported in exceptional circumstances. See generally id.
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percent of the Maquiladora's production to be sold domestically
under certain circumstances."22
Production through the Maquiladora system is advantageous to
both Mexico and the United States. For American companies, the
lower cost of Mexican labor can significantly reduce production costs
in the manufacturing of labor intensive products. Wages in Mexico
range from ten to twenty percent of what comparable employees
would be paid in the United States.' 23 Further, under the Maqui-
ladora system, foreign owners are permitted to send their managerial
and supervisory staff into Mexico with almost no limitations. 24 This
virtually unrestricted entrance differs from the restrictions placed
upon persons who are trying to obtain working visas outside of the
Maquiladora program."'
American companies also obtain the benefit of favorable tariff
schedules because exported items follow special United States Tariff
Schedules which only place duty on the value added by the Mexican
components (including labor).'26 Additionally, under the Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP) of the United States Trade Act of
1974,127 certain articles produced in developing countries, which
would otherwise be dutiable under other United States tariff sched-
ules, may enter the United States free of duty. 2 s Since Mexico is
listed as a developing country, this benefit is available to Mexico and
Maquiladora products. Moreover, through the Maquiladora system,
American companies can also enjoy lower operating costs than in the
United States. Generally, real estate, construction, electricity, natu-
ral gas, and water, cost less in Mexico than in America. 29
Because of Mexico's close proximity to the American market,
122. For a discussion of this modification see infra notes 136-38 and accompanying
text.
123. Farnsworth, Congress Voices Concern over Trade Pact with Mexicd, N.Y.
Times, June 15, 1990, at D2, col. 1.
124. Limitations on placing foreign staff in Mexico are, for the most part, minimal
requirements for obtaining working visas.
Generally, visas issued to foreign employees working at Maquiladora sites in Mexico
are not subject to quotas, restrictions on the activity, national origin, or residence. Also,
the company requesting the permit does not need to technically justify the need for the
foreigner in Mexico. General Population Law, D.O., Jan. 7, 1974, arts. 32, 34, 37, frac-
tion III, art. 48 fraction VI, and art. 119 fraction II.
125. Id.
126. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE U.S.,
ch. 98, at 9-10 (1990) ( U.S. Tariff Schedule Numbers 9802.00.60, and 9802.00.80).
127. U.S. Trade Act of 1974, § 502-506, 19 U.S.C. § 2461-2466 (1988).
128. Id. See also SPECIAL FORM No.1, supra note 41.
129. See Overturf, Japanese Maquiladoras get the most out of an open door, THE
TRADER, 11 (Nov./Dec. 1989).
American companies also benefit from close supervision over the
Mexican operation, as well as reduced freight costs. Close supervi-
sion is not available to United States owned plants in Asia unless
such companies have a permanent managerial team in place. In con-
trast, under the Mexican Maquiladora system, it is possible for
American technicians and supervisors to commute daily to their
plants in Mexico. More importantly however, freight costs to the
American market are reduced by the close proximity between the
manufacturing plant and the United States consumer markets.
The benefits Mexico receives from the Maquiladora program are
not as numerous as those received by the United States, but they
may have a more vital function. Most importantly, the Maquiladora
program creates employment and foreign exchange. In recent years,
the Maquiladora industry has become the second highest source of
foreign exchange in Mexico, second only to oil exports.1 30 There are
currently close to 1,500 Maquiladoras in operation which employ
450,000 workers 31 and create two billion dollars yearly in foreign
exchange.1 32 To accommodate this thriving industry the laws gov-
erning the Maquiladora process have steadily evolved over the past
twenty-five years. Initially, Maquiladoras were limited to the border
areas and were subject to strong government scrutiny; however, the
program's success prompted the Mexican government to expand the
geographical areas permitting Maquiladoras, and to somewhat relax
the government restrictions of them. Thus, as the need to increase
foreign investment capacity has arisen, the Mexican government has
responded by slowly yielding new avenues and opportunities for for-
eign presence through the Maquiladoras.
Although the Maquiladora system has been successful in promot-
ing foreign exchange in Mexico and in providing jobs to its citizens,
this system has its share of problems and limitations. These debilities
run from high employee turnover,133 to the inability of small compa-
nies to obtain financing for Maquiladora developments.134 Further,
cultural differences between Mexico and the mostly-American-
owned parent companies with regard to labor, have created friction
between employees and employers.13 5
130. AN OVERVIEW OF THE MAQUILADORA PROGRAM IN MEXICO, published by
the Committee for the Promotion of Investment in Mexico, at 3, Jan. 1990.
131. Id. at 6. See also tables id. at 23 showing an increase of Maquiladora jobs,
from 18,500 in 1970 to present level.
132. Id. at 2.
133. N. CLEMENT, R. JENNER, P. GANSTER, & A. SETRAN, MAQUILADORA RE-
SOURCE GUIDE at 16 (1989) [hereinafter CLEMENT & JENNER].
134. Social Costs and Gains from the Maquila Industry (Costos sociales e in-gresos de la industria maquiladora), 39 FOREIGN COMMERCE (COMERCIO EXTERIOR)
893 (Oct. 1989).
135. See generally Overturf, supra note 129.
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1. The Maquiladora Law of 1989
President Salinas took steps to further open Mexico to foreign in-
vestment in 1989 through the issuance of a new Maquiladora decree
(law)."3 6 This decree abrogated the 1983 Maquiladora law and re-
newed the government's commitment to the Maquiladoa program by
promoting new business incentives, technical transfers, and the im-
portation of computer and telecommunication equipment. 37 The
new Maquiladora law also permits, in most cases, the sale of up to
fifty percent of the goods produced by the Maquiladora into the
Mexican domestic market."3 8 This law appears to deviate from the
original policy reasons for the Maquiladora program. Initially, Ma-
quiladoras were to be used mainly to provide employment, and for-
eign ownership was tolerated only because it could be controlled and
the products were exported. However, with the new Maquiladora de-
cree, Maquiladoras are now producing goods for sale within Mexico.
B. The New Foreign Investment Regulations of May 16, 1989
While the changes in the Maquiladora law were significant, the
new Foreign Investment Regulations decreed by President Salinas on
May 16, 1989,11 have been the most crucial step in opening Mexico
to foreign investment. The Regulations have created a new opportu-
nity for foreign investment beyond the scope and the purpose of the
existing Maquiladora program. Most importantly, in addition to ex-
isting foreign ownership provisions found in the Maquiladora laws,
these Regulations allow 100 percent foreign ownership of certain
other industries. 4 9 Moreover, these Regulations have opened many
previously closed industries to foreign ownership. Furthermore, the
land trusts through which foreigners hold a thirty year fee interest in
real estate in otherwise "restricted zones,"'' were for the first time
given a renewal clause in the Regulations which promise an addi-
136. Decree for the Promotion and Operation of the Maquiladora Industry for
Exportation, D.O., Dec. 22, 1989, at 12 [hereinafter New Maquila Decree].
137. Id. at ch. I, art. 1, ch. II, arts 5, 6, 10 and Transient Provision art. 2.
138. Id. at art. 20. See also An Overview of the Maquiladora Industry in Mexico,
supra note 130, at 11. The 1983 Maquiladora law provided that only twenty percent of
all production could be sold domestically and then only with certain items. Maquila De-
cree, D.O., Aug. 15, 1983, ch. II, arts. 12, 13.
139. Regulations, D.O., May 16, 1989, at 11.
140. Id. at appendix.
141. For a discussion of the trust system ("Fideicomiso") see supra notes 93-94
and accompanying text and infra note 161 and accompanying text.
tional thirty year ownership interest to foreign landowners. 142
The Regulation's main purpose of attracting foreign investment is
to be accomplished by creating new investment opportunities and
consolidating all of the previous confusing and inconsistent invest-
ment laws. 43 With this single consolidated law, potential investors
can be more secure in their investments. The new Maquiladora de-
cree,14 4 which was made some six months after the May 16, 1989
Regulations, reinforced and expanded the Regulations, and ulti-
mately helped create consistency among the multiple legislative en-
deavors initiated to attract foreign investment.
Also, both the Regulations and the new Maquiladora decree, to a
large degree eliminated bureaucratic requirements and procedures.
Each set up certain bodies and procedures for advising, developing,
and promoting foreign investments, however, without the strictness
of previous laws. Thus, for the first time in many years, the histori-
cally protectionistic Mexican legislators adopted a "laissez-faire" at-
titude towards investment.
1. The Impact of the 1989 Regulations
The 1989 regulations and subsequent reforms reflect the impor-
tance of what Mexico expects to achieve through its current efforts
to attract outside capital. By establishing the framework for a wide
range of investment opportunities in the industrial and commercial
sectors, the Regulations are indicative of the nation's new goal of
cultivating a favorable climate for economic growth.
The 1989 investment changes allow for varying degrees of foreign
ownership depending on a classification given to the industry. There
are seven specific categories of industries which may be summarized
into three general classifications: reserved, restricted, and un-
restricted. 45 Ownership of reserved industries is reserved solely for
the Mexican government and/or Mexican nationals and do not per-
mit any percentage of foreign ownership.'4" Restricted industries
permit foreign ownership of thirty-four, forty, and forty-nine per-
142. Regulations, D.O., May 16, 1989, at ch. III, art. 20.
143. Rohter, Stop the World, Mexico is Getting On, N. Y. Times, June 3, 1990, at
§ 3, Fl.
144. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
145. A complete list of industries and activities and the percent of foreign partici-
pation allowed in each is found in the "Mexican Catalogue of Economic and Productive
Activities" located in the appendix of the May 16, 1989, Regulations. Regulations, D.O.,
May 16, 1989. For a discussion of the May 16, 1989 regulations see supra notes 139-44
and accompanying text.
146. The activities reserved solely for the state and Mexican nationals are those
directly related with oil, gas, uranium, radioactive minerals, electrical energy, and cur-
rency. Among other industries reserved are forestry, transportation, and television and
radio transmissions. Regulations, D.O., May 16, 1989, at appendix.
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cent.1 47 In the industries that allow thirty-four and forty percent for-
eign ownership, a foreigner cannot increase his or her ownership in-
terest.148 However, in the industries open to forty-nine percent
foreign ownership, a foreigner can increase his or her ownership per-
centage 49 by receiving approval from the Ministry of Commerce.
This option is only available with approval by the Foreign Invest-
ment Commission.' 5" Unrestricted industries include all industries
not mentioned in the May 16, 1989 Regulations. 151 These un-
restricted industries permit one hundred percent foreign ownership,
and do not require approval by the Ministry of Commerce if certain
general guidelines are met. 52
Government approval of one hundred percent foreign ownership of
a business within an "unrestricted" industry is now automatic under
the Regulations if: 1) the project is funded by money from abroad;
2) the investment in fixed assets is less than $100,000,000 before the
start of operations; 3) the accumulated foreign exchange flows are
anticipated to be in balance over the first three years of production;
4) the investment will create permanent jobs; 5) the investment com-
plies with environmental requirements; and, 6) the project is not lo-
cated in geographic zones with a heavy industrial concentration .
53
But even if a project fails to meet these qualifications, a permit for
ownership may still be granted by SECOFI (Ministry of Com-
merce). 5 Upon application, SECOFI examines the characteristics
of a proposed investment and will approve it if it conforms to the
government's rationale behind liberalizing foreign investment; i.e.,
does the investment bring the appropriate type of capital into Mex-
ico. Moreover, any permit application which does not receive a for-
147. Industries allowing thirty-four percent foreign ownership include coal and
iron extraction, anything relating to the automobile industry may only have forty percent
foreign ownership, and industries such as mining and fishing can have up to forty-nine
percent or it can be more if approval is received by the foreigner from the Ministry of
Commerce. Id.
148. Id. at tit. II, ch. 1.
149. Id. at ch. 1, art. 10, 11, 12.
150. Regulations, D.O., May 16, 1989, at arts. 13-15 and 23-26.
151. Id. at art. 5.
152. Id. at ch. I, art. 5. Approval from the Commission was required in the past
even to obtain a minority interest. See, Foreign Investment Law, D.O., March 9, 1973, at
art. 5.
153. Regulations, D.O., May 16, 1989, at art. 5, Transient Provision Four. Cities
within geographic zones with a heavy industrial concentration include Mexico City,
Monterrey, and Guadalajara.
154. Id. at art. 2, 1 1. This process in not explicitly stated in the regulations, how-
ever, in a practical sense the permit is obtainable. See discussion on AT&T infra text
accompanying notes 156-57.
mal response from SECOFI within forty-five working days of sub-
mittal will be deemed automatically approved. 15
In response to Mexico's liberalization of foreign investment
through the 1989 regulations, various American companies have al-
ready established operations in Mexico, or are in the process of ac-
quiring permits to establish themselves as wholly foreign-owned sub-
sidiaries. For example, AT&T, which already employs over 1,000
workers in two factories in Mexico, announced that it would expand
its operations by constructing a plant in Guadalajara. This plant
would provide 3,000 jobs by 1991. The fact that AT&T is able to
construct its plant in the major industrial city of Guadalajara, a lo-
cation restricted by the regulations, 58 signifies that the regulations'
limitations on locations for foreign-owned plants may be surmounted
by SECOFI approval. Additionally, although Mexico's investment
policy favors investment for export markets, the AT&T application
was granted by SECOFI even though much of the telephone equip-
ment to be manufactured would be sold in Mexico under an agree-
ment with Mexican-owned Telmex Telecommunications
Company.15
As another example, Louisiana-Pacific, though it was set up as a
Maquiladora, invested 100 million dollars in a wood processing plant
in Ensenada, Mexico. This project processes lumber barged in from
Northern California. The facility employs 1,000 workers, and is des-
tined to become the largest lumber operation in Latin America ac-
cording to officials with the Mexican government and lumber
industry.15 8
One might argue that the establishment of these types of Ameri-
can subsidiaries in Mexico is adverse to the success of American
firms and the American economy in general. This argument is based
on the concept that Mexican firms take away production which
would otherwise be accomplished in the United States. This notion,
however, is not completely true, and in application is contradicted by
both the examples of AT&T and Louisiana-Pacific.
Without the viable alternative of manufacturing in Mexico, eco-
nomic realities might require that the products of these two Ameri-
can companies still be produced in other countries with inexpensive
155. Id. at ch. I, art. 2.
156. See id. at art. 5, 1111 and corresponding administrative provisions. General
Regulation Number Two to Establish Criteria for the Application of Several Provisions
for the Regulations to the Foreign Investment Law, D.O., June 21, 1989, at Rule 2. See
note 153 and accompanying text.
157. AT&T plans Mexico factory for machines now made in China, San Diego
Union, Nov. 30, 1989, at D1, col. 1.
158. Firm pushes Baja lumber mills start, San Diego Union, Dec. 11, 1989, at
A3, col. 1.
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labor;159 however, these other countries would be further away from
America than Mexico, and therefore have higher freight costs. For
example, Louisiana-Pacific would suffer if it had to pay United
States labor costs. In the United States, Louisiana-Pacific would
have to pay higher wages which could render it uncompetitive in the
world market, and ultimately not only affect the jobs which were
transferred to Mexico, but also the service and distribution related
jobs and profits in the United States. Therefore, bargain labor costs
and diminished freight costs to and from Mexico, keep some United
States companies in operation, offering benefits that alternative labor
sites in Asia cannot offer.'60
To date, the 1989 Regulations which liberalized investment of the
type enjoyed by AT&T and Louisiana-Pacific, have not allowed for-
eigners to avoid the thirty year trust system of ownership of real
property in the "restricted" zones.'' The 1989 Regulations, while
not guaranteeing full perpetual ownership of land, do broaden and
liberalize the earlier trust provisions. Under the new 1989 Regula-
tions, previous trusts and any future trusts can be renewed automati-
cally for additional periods of thirty years if such renewal is re-
quested prior to the expiration of the original trust period. 62 The
trust can be renewed without change, transfer cost (excluding the
bank fee), or property tax assessments if the terms and conditions of
the initial trust remain materially unchanged and if the trustee is the
same.163 The ability to add thirty years to an ownership interest may
allay some of the insecurities past investors have had of committing
capital to Mexico's border and coastal areas. Yet, there are still
those who are unwilling to invest in land which cannot be owned
outright. However, the trust renewal program does give foreign in-
vestors some assurance of stability, and it enables foreigners to make
159. See U.S. Jobs Lost to Maquiladoras Would Not Remain in U.S., Fed. Econ-
omist Finds, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) at 1661 (Dec. 20, 1989). Typically, many Asian
countries are associated with inexpensive labor.
160. See supra pp. 36-37; see also infra text pp. 65-68.
161. For purposes of review, before the Executive Order of 1959, foreigners were
not permitted to own any type of interest in land within these zones. The Mexican For-
eign Investment Law of 1973, reconfirmed this stance but allowed an ownership interest
that was limited in duration. The 1973 law granted foreigners the opportunity to hold a
fee interest through a Mexican financial institution by trust or fideicomiso. These trusts
empower the foreign owner to use, rent, lease, sell, transfer, or alienate an entire fee
interest in the property. However, under the original 1959 order and subsequent 1973
law, trusts could not be renewed. See supra notes 72, 93-94, 139-42 and accompanying
text.
162. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
163. Regulations, D.O., May 16, 1989, at art. 21.
long-range plans concerning Mexican land.
The 1989 Regulations also established other programs to promote
foreign investment. For example, a decree made after the enactment
of the Regulations promotes foreign industrial investment in Mex-
ico's northern frontier by creating a type of neutral zone between the
United States and Mexico. x1 4 Within this zone foreign companies
may establish plants and, unlike Maquiladoras, they may sell their
entire output in various northern Mexican cities without restric-
tion.1 15 Additionally, import duties are not imposed on the machin-
ery and equipment, including communication and computer hard-
ware, required for production.166 The decree also permits Mexican
companies to import the above-mentioned items duty free in order to
supply the Maquiladoras and other border industries.16 7
Another similar program, established prior to the 1989 Regula-
tions, is "Temporary Imports for Manufacture of Exports". 6 8 This
program allows foreigners the ability to temporarily import into
Mexico, raw materials, machinery, and components for use in the
production of exports .169 This program suspends import duties and
license requirements for goods and machinery for three years if they
are used in export production.1 70 The law permits sales in Mexico of
up to twenty percent of a company's total production, and up to
thirty percent if at least ten percent of those sales are made close to
the border or in a free zone.17 1
2. The Weaknesses of the 1989 Regulations
Although the 1989 Regulations seem beneficial to Mexico's goal
of attracting foreign investment, they do have inherent weaknesses.
Importantly, the Regulations are not law in the strict sense.1 2 The
Regulations were unable to pass congressional approval in Mexico
164. The neutral zone is composed of northern Mexican border cities, where for-
eigners may set up manufacturing facilities that import materials needed for manufac-
turing free of Mexican duties. The goods produced in these facilities may be sold within
any northern Mexican border city. This is in contrast to a Maquiladora, which may be
located almost anywhere, not just in a northern Mexican border city and can sell only up
to 50% of its production in Mexico without paying import duties. Decree to Promote
Industry in the Northern Bordering and Free Zones of Mexico, D.O., Oct. 31, 1989 at 5.
165. Id. at arts. 1, 2, 3.
166. Id. at art. 7.
167. Id. at art. 8.
168. Decree to Establish Temporary Imports for the Production of Exports, D.O.,
May 9, 1985 [hereinafter Temporary Import Decree]. This 1985 Decree was replaced
and modernized by a new interpretation in 1990. Decree to Establish Temporary Im-
ports for the Production of Exports, D.O., May 3, 1990.
169. Id. See also INTL' TRADE ADMIN. OVERSEAs Bus. RnP., U.S. DEP'T OF COM.,
MARKIETING IN MEXICO, Aug., 1990, at 11.
170. Temporary Import Decree, D.O., May 9, 1985.
171. Id.
172. Rohter, supra note 143.
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and were therefore relegated to executive decree status. Accordingly,
the Regulations are subject to eventual weaknesses in application.17 3
It has been contended that by circumventing the Congress, the presi-
dent exceeded the scope of Mexican law by allowing, through the
Regulations, higher percentages of investment ownership than what
the congressionally accepted foreign investment laws and the Consti-
tution permit.
In response to this contention, the Regulations are enforceable be-
cause they were issued by the president through the exercise of two
constitutional provisions which, when taken together, authorize the
president to legally regulate foreign investment. 174 When the presi-
dent acts under the auspices of these provisions, under Mexican law,
the only type of challenge which could defeat the validity of the act,
in this case the Regulations, would be an "Amparo" challenge." 5
Amparo (which literally means protection) is a concept similar to
U.S. jurisprudence constitutional concepts of "Habeas Corpus,"
"due process," or "equal protection." Through an Amparo claim, a
citizen can attack an act (e.g., the Regulations) made by any branch
of the government which would seemingly infringe upon any rights
guaranteed under the Constitution. The text of the Constitution's ar-
ticles relating to foreign presence in Mexico do not permit some of
the investment opportunities being offered in the recent liberalization
of the Regulations.7
Some Mexican industrialists and entrepreneurs were tempted to
challenge the Constitutionality of the Regulations through the
Amparo process. However, because Article 5 of the 1973 Foreign
Investment Law permits the president's actions, 7 7 these claims
would most likely have failed and were not made. This possible con-
173. Foreign Investment: The Open Door (Inversion extranjera: A Puerta
Abierta), Expansion (Expansion) 30, at 38 (July 5, 1989).
174. CONST., supra note 65, at arts. 89, fraction I and art. 131.
175. Amparo Law (Ley de Amparo, Reglamentaria de los Articulos 103 y 107 de
la Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos), D.O., Jan. 10, 1936 [herein-
after Amparo]; at arts. 103 and 107 for the Constitutional guidelines regarding Amparo
law.
176. For example, originally the text of the Constitution prohibited ownership
rights for foreigners in border and coastal areas. That right, however, has since been
granted to foreigners through a trust system that has been expanded by the Regulations.
Compare CONST. supra note 65, at ch. I, art. 27, § I and Regulations, D.O., May 15,
1989, at art. 20. For an expanded discussion see Gomez-Palacio, supra note 84, at 258-
63.
177. Article 5 of the 1973 Foreign Investment Law applies to Constitutional Art.
131, and through this application grants the president power to regulate foreign invest-
ment. Foreign Investment Law, D.O., Mar. 9, 1973, at art. 5.
flict between the Constitution and the 1973 Foreign Investment Law
is one of the inconsistencies which the 1989 Regulations has at-
tempted to solve. It seems that the 1973 law gives powers to the
president which were exercised in the 1989 Regulations to avoid hav-
ing to modify fixed constitutional limitations. Thus, President Sali-
nas used the 1973 and 1989 investment laws to implement new trade
policies which otherwise may have required an amendment to the
Constitution.
However, in actuality, challenges to the Regulations are ineffec-
tive. First, an Amparo challenge by a citizen against a state act,
such as the Regulations, is only relevant to the individual who made
the claim.17 8 Therefore, if a law is found to violate a petitioner's
rights under the Constitution, and this determination is reached by
Amparo procedures, the determination is only applicable to the ac-
tual petitioner. Though Amparo ruling precedents may be argued by
other individuals in subsequent judicial proceedings, the Amparo
precedent may not be binding on the second court unless it has be-
come "jurisprudence". 17 Therefore, practically, individual Amparo
decisions do not apply to the general population.
Second, a short statute of limitations on an Amparo challenge
thwarts most viable claims for relief. For example, once the govern-
ment publishes a decree, an individual has only thirty days to file an
Amparo claim with the courts.1 80 However, a separate fifteen days is
given to a potential Amparo petitioner when the decree is specifically
enforced upon him. 8" Under this system, every citizen who desires
to challenge a decree must petition the court within one of these two
periods. 8 1 With regard to the 1989 Regulations, the Amparo statute
of Limitations has run, therefore, no one would currently have stand-
ing to challenge the Regulations on a Constitutional Amparo
ground.
Because an Amparo challenge against the Regulations is practi-
cally ineffective due to the above limitations, the only real way that
the Regulations could be defeated, would be through a change in
Mexico's current political structure. However, until such a change
occurs, the current government has carte blanche to fully execute all
of the provisions of the Regulations without challenge, even though
they may conflict with both congressional law and the Mexican Con-
178. Amparo, D.O., Jan. 10, 1936, at ch. X.
179. "Jurisprudence" in this sense is the binding effect of Superior Court decisions
on inferior courts' decisions once the decisions have met certain requirements; i.e., that
which is decided and sustained in five Superior court judgments, uninterrupted by any in
the contrary, and approved with certain voting percentages within the Supreme Court.
See id. at tit. IV, arts. 192, 193, 194, 196, 197b.
180. Id. at ch. III, art. 22, fraction I.
181. Id. at ch. III, art. 21.
182. Id.
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stitution. A change in the current political make-up of Mexico may
likely occur in the next general election in 1993. If this does occur,
the Regulations may not have the political force necessary to be
upheld.""'
The Regulations clearly show the government's intention, for for-
eign investment, but they have not been sufficient to transform the
Mexican economy into a completely open market. Nonetheless, the
Regulations are allowing foreign investment into Mexico, and do act
as a preparatory step towards the FTA. The Regulations were not
intended to be a long-term solution, but rather, were issued in haste
(without congressional approval) and thus may not be perceived as
permanent. However, the Regulations do pave the way for foreign
investment by reforming the spirit of the Constitution (or eventually
its text), without effectively breaking the law or changing the Consti-
tution. And, through the Regulations, President Salinas has effec-
tively precluded any legal challenge to the opportunities now given to
foreigners who wish to invest in Mexico under the Regulation's
guidelines.
3. The Government's Plans to Further Liberalize
Foreign Investment
A few months after enacting the Regulations, President Salinas
began to take further steps to open Mexico to outside investment. In
an address to the United States Congress on October 4, 1989, he
announced plans to further liberalize economic opportunities in Mex-
ico beyond the scope of the May Regulations." 4 He cited a desire to
spur economic growth, increase global competitiveness, fight poverty,
and modernize Mexico through increased international trade."8 This
unqualified statement directly opposed Mexico's prior general policy
against foreign investment which had been intact for fifty years.
However, not forgetting the past completely, President Salinas
briefly reminded the United States Congress of Mexico's historical
aversion to foreign intervention and its strong feeling of nationalism
by stating that wealth is not always measured in economic terms. 18 6
Thus, in this address, President Salinas stated the paradox which
foreign investment creates in Mexico: do the benefits of modern
trade liberalization exceed the need to follow the historical rationale
183. See generally infra p. 89-93.




However, despite the nationalistic concerns President Salinas ex-
pressed to the U.S. Congress, he did concede that in this rapidly
changing world, trade liberalization is necessary. And under this
concession, Mexico would be compelled to accept a position of global
interdependence which heretofore was undesirable and unwarranted.
As Mexico's global interdependency expands, the benefit of such ex-
pansion - the possibility of economic prosperity, will have to be rec-
onciled with the fears generated by Mexico's history of foreign inter-
vention. Because President Salinas enacted the May, 1989,
Regulations, it appears that he has concluded that liberalization is
necessary to preserve the freedom and justice won by the Revolution
and Constitution; that trade regulations promote the economic recov-
ery essential to Mexico's self-determination.
IV. OTHER MEASURES AND CHANGES To LURE FOREIGN
INVESTMENT To MEXICO
In addition to the 1989 Regulations, Mexico has taken other steps
to lure foreign investment. These steps include changes in foreign
investment policy to convince foreigners that Mexico is a safe loca-
tion for foreign investment. Mexico has also recently adopted new
trade promotion measures.
A. Changes in Foreign Investment Policy
The following sections briefly present some of the scattered mea-
sures completed by Mexico in the 1980s to attract investment. The
actions discussed in the six sections below have all been implemented
to show the world that Mexico is a safe forum for foreign invest-
ment. These changes should help foreigners regain confidence in
Mexican industry; confidence which may have been lost when Mex-
ico's oil industry was nationalized in 1938.187
1. The Privatization of Public Enterprise
Since 1983, Mexico has privatized public enterprises to modernize
Mexico's economy.188 This privatization has achieved a substantial
influx of foreign exchange, eliminated the burdens of inefficiently run
enterprises (the legacy of a government controlled economy), and at-
tracted Mexican capital which had fled during the earlier crisis years
187. See generally A. RIDING, supra note 24, at 54-55, 160-161. See supra note
85 and infra note 275.
188. Work & Bussey, supra note 63, at 96; Mexico: State Run Telephone Com-
pany to Go Private, With Foreign Investment Limited to 23 Percent, Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1198 (Sept. 20, 1989).
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(1982-88).189 Furthermore, to curb inflation, the government began
to pay the domestic debt with proceeds obtained from the privatiza-
tion process. 190 Through the divestiture of these public companies,
Mexico has enjoyed a capital injection which has strengthened the
public sector and provided new economic opportunities. 191
2. Controlling the Value of the Peso
Mexico has also taken steps to stabilize its currency. President
Salinas' administration decided to gradually reduce the pace of the
Mexican peso's devaluation to the United States dollar.192 To pre-
vent increases in the rate on January 1, 1990, a slide of one peso per
day on average was instituted against the United States' dollar. 193
This trend was further reduced during 1990 to .8 pesos a day and
then to .4 pesos, to make Mexican currency more predictable.
3. Changes in the Tax System
Mexico has also begun to slowly change its tax system. This in-
cludes a gradual reduction of the personal income tax rate from fifty
percent in 1986, to thirty-five percent in 1991, and in the corporate
rate from fifty-six percent to thirty-five percent in the same pe-
riod.9 Further, a system of equal application in the income tax laws
has been established to eliminate former loopholes which were used
to exempt or apply reduced rates to certain industries. 19 5 These mea-
sures are being supported by stronger enforcement of the tax laws. 96
4. The Restructure of Debt Payments
In March 1990, Mexico finalized a foreign debt restructuring
agreement with the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.) which re-
duced yearly debt payments by four billion dollars through a de-
crease in interest rates. 97 Most likely this reduction was not a result
189. Ortiz, Mexico's Been Bitten by the Privatization Bug, Wall St. J., Sep. 15,
1989, at 13.
190. See Work & Bussey, supra note 63.
191. Ortiz, supra note 189.
192. Rohter, New Leader Drops Freeze on Prices, Wages, and Currency, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 13, 1988, at D1, col. 6.
193. Mexico's Economic Control Program, 6 Int'l. Trade Rep. (BNA) 820 (June
21, 1989).
194. New Tax Law, D.O., Dec. 31, 1986, at arts. 801, 803.
195. Mexico: The New Model Debtor, supra note 31, at 87.
196. Id.
197. Communique from the Mexican Ministry of Finance in Regards to the For-
of negotiating skill, but rather, was the result of pressure on the
I.M.F. from the United States. The United States pressured I.M.F.
concessions, to prevent an increase in illegal Mexican
immigration.119
5. Efforts to Curb Drug Trafficking and Corruption
Mexico has also taken steps to curb drug trafficking and corrup-
tion. Mexico has increased its efforts to combat drugs being traf-
ficked through Mexico. 99 President Salinas has focused special at-
tention on this problem, and has thus demonstrated his willingness to
assist the United States in its war against this scourge.200 President
Salinas has taken these steps to create a climate of confidence in his
administration, and to demonstrate that his government can control
activities occurring within Mexico's borders.
Furthermore, since early in his term, President Salinas has held
firm to his commitment against corruption by sending numerous cor-
rupt leaders of influential organizations to prison. 201 This includes
the labor union chief of the Mexican oil company, and other impor-
tant and wealthy bankers who participated in stock exchange frauds
and scandals.20 2
6. The Privatization of Mexican Banks
One of the most important and meaningful steps illustrating Mex-
ico's desire to attract foreign investment is the privatization of Mexi-
can banks. Previously, foreigners could not have any ownership inter-
est in Mexican Financial institutions.20 3 However, on July 18, 1990,
a new banking law was issued, and under its regulations, foreigners
may have up to thirty percent ownership in Mexican financial insti-
tutions. Foreign individual holdings may reach up to ten percent of
the total capital with government authorization, and up to five per-
cent without it.20 4
eign Debt Restructure (Comunicado dela SHCP en torno de la firma del paquetefinanciero), 40 FOREIGN COMMERCE (COMERCIO EXTERIOR) 371 (Apr. 1990).
198. Mexico: The New Model Debtor, supra note 31, at 86.
199. Pastor, Another Revolutionary Comes Calling, L.A. Times, June 8, 1990, at§ B, at 7, col. 2. See also Mexico Tough on Drugs, The L.A. Daily J., Jan. 3, 1990, at 6,
col. 1.
200. Mexico Tough on Drugs, supra note 199, at 6, col. 1.
201. Pastor, supra note 199, § B, at 7, col. 2.
202. See Moffett, New Union Chief Reins in Mexico Oil Worker, Wall St. J., Oct.
19, 1989, at A15, col. 2.
203. In September 1982, Financial Institutions in Mexico were nationalized disal-
lowing any foreign ownership. Though the nationalization was effective immediately, the
Constitution had to be modified before the actual law could be enacted.
204. The New Credit Institutions Law, D.O., Jul. 18, 1990, at tit. II, ch. 1, art. II,
fraction III, and arts. 15, 17.
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Privatizing Mexican banks is a significant step, because unlike all
of the other changes mentioned in this section, Salinas' administra-
tion reformed the Mexican Constitution to permit foreign investment
into banks.2 5 It is especially significant because this privatization
has occurred only eight years after the 1982 nationalization of all
banks.208 This major shift in Constitutional policy was possible
partly because the banking industry does not have the same histori-
cally deep-rooted national sentiment as the Constitutional provisions
relating to labor and land.
B. New Trade Promotion Measures to Open Mexico to Foreign
Investment and the FTA
Besides the new foreign investment policies, Mexico has also re-
cently adopted new trade promotion measures. The government's
trade policies have laid the foundation for Mexico to enter into a
free trade agreement. The following sections present some of the
measures recently completed by Mexico to lower trade barriers and
to promote global exchange.
1. External Trade Measures (Reduction of Tariffs,
etc.)
At the end of 1987, Mexico reduced tariffs from an average of
forty percent to a maximum of twenty percent, and also dramatically
reduced the number of products subject to prior import permits from
12,000 items to only 330.211 Mexico has also discontinued the system
of official prices for custom's valuation purposes, and has eliminated
the export development tax on imports.2 8
2. Changes to Copyright, Trademark, Patent, and
Immigration Laws
Mexico's legislative branch has given special treatment to issues
which not only promote the influx of investment, but that also make
Mexico a better candidate for the North American trade alliance.
Among the trade laws modified by the legislators were laws relating
205. Decree that Controls the Reforms to the Constitution Regarding Article 28
Paragraph 5, D.O., June 27, 1990.
206. See generally Uchitelle, When Going Private is a Very Public Affair, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 25, 1990, at 33.
207. Brisson, supra note 35, at 7.
208. Id.
to technology transfers and patent protection, with new regulations
issued on January 9, 1990;209 and immigration, with regulations is-
sued on July 17, 1990.210 In the former, tougher and longer protec-
tive terms have been given to inventions; and, in the latter, longer
and easier terms were granted for obtaining business visitor visas.
These concessions enabled Ms. Carla Hills, the U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative, to announce that Mexico has been excluded from the pri-
ority observation list of Special Amendment 301 to Section 201 of
the Omnibus Trade Act.211
Although the steps previously discussed, standing alone, may not
appear to be in preparation or furtherance of the FTA, they, in con-
junction with other changes, have paved the way for such an agree-
ment.212 These other changes include several agreements that have
been recently signed or renewed between Mexico and the United
States.
3. Other Agreements To Promote Trade
The most important of these agreements is the "U.S.-Mexico Bi-
lateral Framework on Trade and Investment" originally signed in
1987.213 This agreement was renewed in March 1989, and covers the
topics of steel, electronics, textiles, agriculture, tariffs, foreign invest-
ment, intellectual property, transportation, and insurance services, In
October, 1989, both governments signed several additional agree-
ments regarding investment and trade.214 These agreements encom-
pass the areas of petrochemicals, agronomy, cattle, steel, textiles, ap-
parel, duties, and subsidies.215 Also* established was the Joint
209. Regulations to the Law on the Control and Regulation of Technology Trans-
fer and the Use and Exploitation of Trademarks, D.O., Jan. 9, 1990; see also Marketing
in Mexico, supra note 169, at 15.
210. New Credit Institutions Law, D.O., Jul. 17, 1990.
211. Section 301 broadly states that if the U.S. Trade Representative (U.S.T.R.)
determines any of the United States Trade rights under any trade agreement are being
denied, that the U.S.T.R. may take action against the offending nation. This action may
include suspending trade benefits, imposing duties, or entering into further agreements,
etc., to eliminate the prior trade breach. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988, 19 U.S.C. 2901, at sec. 2251 (Title II. ch. 1, sec. 201), sec. 2411 (Title III. ch.1,
sec. 301). See also generally Mohn, Mexico's New foreign Investment Regulations Sig-
nal Commitment to Become an Open, Modern Economy, Bus. Ai mR., Dec. 4,1989, at 5.
212. Baker, Mexico: A New Economic Era, Bus. WK., Nov. 12, 1990, at 105.
213. U.S. and Mexico Sign Bilateral Framework on Trade, 4 Int'l. Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1378 (Nov. 11, 1987) for text of agreement see same at 1410.
214. SPECIAL FORM No. 1, Bancomext, supra note 41, at 3.
215. For discussion and text of the agreements see SPECIAL FORM No. 1,
Bancomext, supra note 41, at 3; Mexico, U.S. to Sign Procedural Agreement Setting
Guidelines For Bilateral Trade Talks, 6 Int'l. Trade Rep. (BNA) 1253-1254 (Oct. 4,
1989); U.S.-Mexico Understanding Sets Up Process for Negotiating Expanded Trade,
Investment, 6 Int'l. Trade Rep. (BNA) 1290-91 (Oct. 11, 1989), for text of agreement
see same at 1325-27 [hereinafter Understanding].
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Committee for Investment and Trade.2 1 6
V. ANALYSIS OF THE NEED FOR AN FTA
A. The Types of Investments to be Generated by the FTA
The most natural consequence of a free trade agreement is the
relocation of American assembling, manufacturing, and labor inten-
sive industries to Mexico, where labor is inexpensive and available.
The increased investment into Mexico resulting from such relocation
will create opportunities in Mexican industries and expand markets
within Mexico. This is especially true for regional agriculture, as
well as for Mexican industries which have adequate markets, but
which are currently underdeveloped due to lack of capital (i.e.,
heavy industry, services, transportation, and telecommunications).
The FTA should target three major types of investment; relocation
of manufacturing and industrial plants, heavy industry investment,
and agricultural investment. From a Mexican perspective, two of
these three major types of investments should enjoy fairly prompt
success. With regard to the relocation of manufacturing and indus-
trial plants, the construction of these plants will generate investment
in Mexico. Also, heavy industry investments have already increased
because Mexico's liberalized foreign investment policies, through the
May 1989, Regulations, and this type of investment should continue
to grow as the FTA is enacted. Foreign agricultural investment in
Mexico, however, may not enjoy such success. Restrictions placed on
agriculture, such as the "ejido" system implemented by the Mexican
Constitution, do not freely allow change or investment.117 Thus, for-
eign investment in agriculture would be more heavily regulated than
the other activities and, in some circumstances, may only occur if the
Constitution is modified.
Although not completely problem free, Mexico's recent liberalized
foreign investment policies appear to have been successful. After the
enactment of the Regulations, and following discussions of the FTA,
foreign investment in Mexico has increased substantially. Data from
Mexico's Ministry of Trade has concluded that investment in the
first nine months of 1990 has already surpassed ten percent of the
cumulative total of all foreign capital in the country. 18 Among
216. Understanding, supra note 215, at 1290.
217. For a discussion of the "ejido" program see infra notes 287-95 and accompa-
nying text.
218. Mexico Economic Newsletter, Published by the Committee for the Promotion
projects which can be cited as a direct consequence of Mexico's new
investment policies are plants established by Nissan,219 Ford, Volk-
swagen, Goodyear, Bosch, Nestle, Rhone-Poulenc, and Pepsi Co. 220
Further, in the tourism industry, American and British groups have
invested two billion dollars in the Cancun area. This success in both
industry and tourism, should continue to grow after the FTA is
enacted.
B. Why America Needs the FTA
For Americans with foresight, the FTA is a reasonable method of
strengthening the economy and preparing for America's economic
future. The agreement holds the keys to benefit many sectors of the
American economy. As nations have become more interdependent 221
division of production is used to promote greater efficiency as inter-
national trade tends to make the world more specialized.222 Working
with Mexico as an ally in a trade block would give the United States
the ability to use Mexican labor to exercise the theory of compara-
tive advantages and allow both the United States and Mexico to face
international competition more efficiently.2 Without the ability to
utilize the geographically near and less costly Mexican labor, Ameri-
can jobs would have to go somewhere else. Considering the global
economic trends that are giving rise to warlike trade competition,
some jobs cannot remain in the United States.224 Ultimately, if the
United States cannot remain competitive in these jobs, it will have to
choose whether to only produce other non-labor intensive products or
to become economically isolated and protectionistic.
To offset America's impending inability to compete with labor in-
tensive manufacturers in other regions, other types of manufacturing
must be pursued. This would include technological and capital inten-
sive production. The United States, however, could still participate
in labor intensive manufacturing by investing in Mexico through the
FTA. As other developed nations scramble to find competitive labor
sources and to take advantage of comparative costs, the United
States will already be able to enjoy this advantage with Mexico. If
the United States holds back and does not hedge its future by secur-
of Investment, Fall 1990, at 3.
219. Guiles, Nissan Begins Big Expansion of Mexico Site, Wall St. J., Apr. 20,
1990, at A4.
220. Mexico Economic Newsletter, supra note 218.
221. Sanchez, Mexico's New Foreign Investment Climate, 12 Hous. J. OF INT'L. L.
246 (1990).
222. P. SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 647.
223. North American Trade Free Zone Would Top EC in Population, Output,
Mexican Official Says, supra note 9.
224. Experiences Learned from U.S.-Canada FTA will Help Talks with Mexico,
Official Says, 8 Int'l. Trade Rep. (BNA) 122 (Jan. 23, 1991).
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ing a competitive labor source, it could possibly find itself competing
against labor rich nations, such as Mexico, in the world market. And
due to wage disparities, the United States will find itself being un-
dersold 2 5 However, through the FTA, United States' firms can re-
main globally competitive by utilizing the same asset that it could be
competing against, low cost labor in Mexico.
The practice of producing off-shore, is not new to the United
States or to other developed countries. Alternative labor sources have
been used widely and their use will increase.226 In some instances,
United States labor intensive production has already turned to other
labor sources in Asia and the Maquiladoras in Mexico to remain
competitive.227 In some instances, Maquiladoras are providing labor
to American companies that, without the Maquiladoras, would turn
to Asian labor sources or be forced to stop business.22 8 For example,
an American manufacturing plant that has difficulty competing with
Asian manufactured goods can turn to a Mexican operation and still
be competitive. 229 Thus, production in Mexico (through a Maqui-
ladora or straight investment under the FTA) is an alternative to
closing shop or moving production to an Asian country. A United
States-owned Mexican operation is significantly better because none
of the Asian alternatives will soon have an FTA with the United
States, and are thus unlikely to provide a market. In addition, use of
an Asian alternative would result in more raw materials and compo-
nents used to manufacture the goods in Asia, being purchased from
Asian sources, not American, since many of the labor rich Asian
countries are in a trading block with each other. In this case, the
more viable option of producing in Mexico is obvious, where materi-
als and components to a large degree will come from the United
States.
Moreover, under the benefits of the FTA, American firms can ac-
crue additional benefits exceeding those that are now being reaped
through the Maquiladoras and Asia. When compared to the Maqui-
ladora program, under the FTA, American domestic products will
225. Debt relief to Boost Mexico's Economy Would Increase U.S. Exports, JEC
Reports, 5 Int'l. Trade Rep. (BNA) 1399 (Oct. 19, 1988).
226. W. Johnston, Global Workforce 2000: The New World Labor Market, 69
HARV. Bus. REV. 115 (Mar.-Apr., 1991).
227. U.S. Jobs Lost to Maquiladoras Would Not Remain in U.S., Fed Economist
Finds, supra note 159, at 1661.
228. Id.
229. A. PASTOR & J. CASTANADA, supra note 37, at 209-10. In this example,
Zenith's Chairman, Jerry Pearlman, claimed that if Zenith had not saved $400 million a
year by producing in Mexico, that it would be out of business.
have an increased marketplace in Mexico. Many experts believe that
Mexico is poised to become a great market,230 which, if America
gets in on the ground floor, may be the biggest benefit of the FTA.
Mexico's emerging market will be bolstered by the new employment
and revenue to be generated by the FTA. This increased employ-
ment in Mexico is especially important when-one realizes that many
of the jobs created in Mexico are low wage jobs manufacturing prod-
ucts that, if not produced in Mexico, would most likely be produced
in Asia. Having these items produced in Mexico is more advanta-
geous to America because much of the revenue earned from Mexi-
can exports will be spent in the United States while that earned in
Asia will not.23l This means a benefit to the United State's economy.
Furthermore, it has been projected that for every billion dollars ex-
ported through a North American trade agreement, that 25,000 jobs
would be created.23 2 Thus, even if it were assumed that all of these
jobs were created in Mexico, the United States would still receive a
vast benefit as the revenue earned from increased Mexican exports
would generally be spent in the United States by the Mexican work-
ers.23 3 Not only will the new jobs and production affect American
firms and workers but with new jobs and capital in Mexico a greater
market is created. A market, which under the FTA, could have di-
rect and possibly complete access to American goods or materials.
This access for American goods is not practically available in Asia
or under the Maquiladora system where domestic sales are limited to
a set percentage. Moreover, for American firms manufacturing in
Mexico, transportation costs to return goods back to the United
States for sale in the United States will be much less than if the
same goods were being shipped from Asia.
The FTA also contributes a benefit to U.S. consumers. The price
paid in America for Mexican-made consumer goods, components, or
raw materials will be affordable and readily available in the United
States market. Moreover, items imported to the United States from
Mexico are much more likely to use American resources and materi-
als in production than items imported to the United States from
Asian countries.23 4
It is understood that for many Americans, especially those work-
230. House Agriculture Committee, supra note 39; Free Trade Pact with Mexico
Earns General Support, Though Reservations are Expressed, 7 Int'l. Trade Rep. (BNA)
1002 (July 4, 1990).
231. Free Trade Pact with Mexico Earns General Support Though Reservations
are Expressed, supra note 230.
232. Id.
233. Id. Approximately seventy percent of Mexico's imports currently come from
the United States. See MExIco 1990, supra note 18, at 126.
234. North American Free Trade Zone Would Top EC in Population, Output,
Mexican Official Says, supra note 9, at 51.
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ing in industrial areas, that the FTA could mean a job redistribution
or a temporary job loss. However, without the FTA, long-range
American job security and availability may be at a higher risk. Job
availability, especially for people working in the manufacturing sec-
tor, will ultimately be permanently diminished if trade barriers have
to be erected to protect existing American and Canadian jobs or if
jobs are lost because American/Canadian production is not competi-
tive internationally.
Though important, the quantity of labor-intensive manufacturing
jobs in the United States should not be the only touchstone to mea-
sure America's economic success. This is especially true if the mar-
kets for American goods are alienated by higher American prices.
Though manufacturing jobs may be redistributed to other sectors,
the overall outlook for jobs in the United States should not decrease
because of the FTA. Due to increased competition, the United
State's employment may not always remain consistent. If any drop
in employment levels do occur, the FTA should not be blamed for
that drop. More logically, the drop will be a response to other factors
such as the high cost of American made products competing against
products made by less expensive labor. The FTA, in practice, should
be a counter weight to a slide in employment by helping to keep job
and commerce levels constant by increasing trade and exports. The
FTA should enhance the North American block's export ability by
supplying competitive products via less expensive labor in Mexico.
With part of America's manufacturing jobs going to Mexico, more
jobs will focus on the sales, distribution, marketing, and services sec-
tors of American employment. These should ultimately be more sta-
ble to workers than previous manufacturing jobs because wage com-
petitiveness is not so much a factor and the jobs are not unnaturally
sustained by subsidies or artificial markets but as a result of market
forces.
If the FTA is entered into, the American firms that stay competi-
tive will continue; other firms will have the option to stay competitive
by producing in Mexico. This Mexico option facilitates the preserva-
tion of those American businesses. To American corporations, Mex-
ico provides the option to preserve some jobs rather than to lose en-
tire industries.235 Without the FTA, American firms will have to
face the choice of closing shop within this generation, reducing sala-
ries within the next few years or moving to other more distant labor
235. See A. PASTOR & J. CASTA EDA, supra note 37, at 209.
markets. Thus, by accepting the implementation of the FTA, Ameri-
cans will have a greater ability to control their own future. Through
the FTA, America can remain active and competitive in global com-
merce, create and maintain domestic employment, gain access to a
large emerging market in Mexico, and enjoy lower consumer costs at
home.23 6
Indirect benefits will also be enjoyed after the FTA is enacted. By
moving production to Mexico more Mexicans will be prone to stay at
home because adequate employment would be available.237 The re-
sulting lack of impetus to leave Mexico should naturally curtail im-
migration to the United States. Without the FTA, if growth contin-
ues in Mexico, pressure on the border will intensify, and, unless it is
relieved, the social and economic problems of illegal immigration
will grow with Mexico's population. Thus, in addition to economic
matters, a grave social concern can be alleviated by the FTA.
C. Why Mexico Needs an FTA: The Turning Point
Sometime between November, 1988, and June, 1990, President
Salinas changed his position on the feasibility of a free trade agree-
ment. When Presidents-elect Bush and Salinas met in Houston in
November, 1988, to discuss economic issues between their countries,
they did not discuss trade liberalization, even though at that time, a
trade agreement between the United States and Canada was being
negotiated. 238 This silence on the topic was consistent with President
Salinas' previous statement in 1988, that he did not believe such a
common market would provide an advantage to either country.2 3
Just prior to accepting the idea of an FTA, President Salinas vis-
ited Japan and Europe in attempts to attract foreign investment to
Mexico. Though the countries he visited recognized and praised
Mexico's efforts to encourage foreign investment, because of a global
shortage of capital, their responses fell far short of what Salinas and
236. In a United States International Trade Commission report, the "overwhelm-
ing majority" of experts surveyed supported the concept of a bilateral free trade agree-
ment between the United States and Mexico. According to the report, the experts agreed
that the FTA would provide the following advantages to the United States: 1) enhance
the competitive position of the United States among emerging trade blocks; 2) help de-
velop the U.S. border area; 3) create jobs in the United States; 4) give certainty and
predictability to U.S. investors by making Mexican economic liberalization permanent;
and 5) decrease the flow of illegal immigrants to the United States. ITC Report Finds
Broad Support for Concept of Bilateral Free Trade Accord with Mexico, 7 Int'l. Trade
Rep. (BNA) 1622 (Oct. 24, 1990).
237. Legislators Urge that U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Talks Also Address Drug
Problem, 7 Int'l. Trade Rep. (BNA) 903 (June 20, 1990).
238. Rohter, North American Trade Bloc? Mexico Rejects Such an Idea, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 24, 1988, at D23, col. 1.
239. Id.
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his group had anticipated.24 ° In Europe, Salinas was completely re-
jected. The Europeans were too busy with the new democracies, es-
pecially Germany, as well as the changes in the Soviet Union. They
were not ready to commit money to Mexico when opportunities were
presented closer to home in Eastern Europe.241
Japan's answer to President Salinas' request was less direct. Japan
responded that it would invest in Mexico if Mexico would guarantee
certainty for Japan's investments, as well as access to the United
States market for Japan's Mexican made products.242 Japan's quali-
fied assurances were too remote and conditional for the urgent needs
of Mexico; therefore, because President Salinas could not rely on
Japanese investment, he had to alter his plan of diversification of
capital.
Upon his return, Salinas, disappointed in the results of his trip,
realized that the agreement between the United States and Canada
was beginning to produce favorable results.243 Mexico had been ex-
cluded from the United States/Canada Free Trade Agreement, and
if it vacillated, it could be excluded from a future trade block to be
formed by the United States, Canada, and other countries in the
region.244 The possibility of exclusion concerned President Salinas.24 5
If Mexico did not participate in a regional free trade agreement, it
might become isolated and would suffer from a continued lack of
capital. Also, without an FTA, modernization of Mexico would be
more difficult because Mexico would have less access to foreign tech-
nology and goods based on the theory of comparative costs or advan-
tages.246 This latter effect would be similar to what occurred when
Mexico abstained from the GATT. 47
Only months after President Salinas rejected the possibility of a
free trade agreement, both countries' governments issued a joint
communique unveiling their intentions to eventually sign a pact.248
240. Kaslow, supra note 9.
241. Id.
242. Pastor, supra note 199.
243. Mohn, U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Means Greater Mutual Prosper-
ity, Bus. Amer., Oct. 8, 1990, at 3-4.
244. Pastor, supra note 199.
245. See Auerbach, Mexico Comes Calling for Free Trade, Wash. Post, June 10,
1990, at HI.
246. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
247. For a general overview of Mexico's accession to the GATT, see English, The
Mexican Accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 23 TEX. INT'L. L.J.
339 (1988).
248. Bush and Mexican President Salinas Agree to Move Toward Free Trade
Agreement, supra note 37; Auerbach, supra note 245, at Hi.
What were the reasons for such a sudden change in position? Most
likely the disappointment of not receiving European and Japanese
commitments to invest in Mexico, as well as Mexico's fear of being
excluded from a North American trade block in the rapidly aligning
world.
After failing to obtain investment from other sources, President
Salinas concluded that an FTA was desirable.24 9 He realized that
even with all of Mexico's recent economic achievements, there was
still an urgent need to generate one million jobs every year.210 For-
eign investment is necessary to create jobs, and the FTA is the best
available course to accomplish this goal.s5
In November, 1988, President-elect Salinas argued that Mexico's
participation in the GATT eliminated the need for a free trade
agreement. The need, however, could reappear with the possible col-
lapse of GATT.252 Without the GATT, unless Mexico enters into the
FTA, Mexico will find itself in a vulnerable position, without any
type of membership in a trade alliance. Except for the FTA, no
other apparatus currently exists which can generate the foreign in-
vestment and economic support that Mexico requires. Thus, changes
in the world are further pushing Mexico into the FTA.
Isolation is not advantageous for Mexico. 253 If Mexico does not
take this one step forward of entering into the FTA, it may end up
having to take two steps back. Mexico is in need of capital, markets,
and technology that it cannot acquire from its South or Central
American neighbors. However, this desperate need may place Mex-
ico in a diminished bargaining position as negotiations on the FTA
begin.
VI. JAPAN AND OTHER COUNTRIES' REACTION To THE FTA
AND RECENT CHANGES IN MEXICO
The United States is not the only country positioning itself in
Mexico. Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan have also been at-
tracted to production in Mexico but through indirect investing
through the Maquiladora program.25 "4 However, Japan's reaction to
recent changes in investment policy merits special attention because
249. Rohter, Free-Trade Talks With U.S. Set Off Debate In Mexico, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 29, 1990, at Al, col. B.
250. See C. Salinas, supra note 100. See also Salinas de Gortari, supra note 22;
Auerbach, supra note 245.
251. See generally C. Salinas, supra note 100.
252. See Executives Regret Collapse of GATT Negotiations, Wall St. J., Dec. 13,
1990, at A2, col 1. See also, Longworth, supra note 4.
253. See generally, Salinas Address, supra note 21.
254. An Overview of the Maquiladora Industry, supra note 130, at 7. See also,
House Judiciary Panel Hears Mixed Reviews on Economic Effects of Foreign Take-
overs, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 300 (Mar. 2, 1988).
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it was one of President Salinas' specific targets in his quest for
outside capital. Therefore, Japan will be used as a specific example
to illustrate that generally, because of the uncertainty of Mexico's
current legal regime, countries are reluctant to directly invest in
Mexico. However, as a consequence of the FTA between the United
States and Mexico, certainty in Mexico should increase and help
boost foreign investment in Mexico by other nations. As the FTA
becomes more of a reality, Japan will increasingly invest into
Mexico.
Japan is considered to be a key source of investment that Mexico
cannot afford to alienate. 55 Japan has made some investments in
Mexico, but relative to Japan's total foreign spending, Mexico can-
not be considered to be a big Japanese investment target. Japanese
investment into Mexico accounts for only five percent of Japan's to-
tal foreign investment.256
Generally, the Japanese are skeptical of doing business in Mex-
ico.25 7 With regards to Japanese investment in Mexico, Japan wants
to follow the traditional investment strategy profile that has made its
empire so strong; e.g., thorough research of the economic situation,
and assurance that a viable market exists before expenditures are
made.25 ' Because of the inconsistency of Mexican investment poli-
cies, the Japanese have especially relied on their traditional invest-
ment strategy profile, .instead of direct foreign investment through
the 1989 Regulations. This reliance is illustrated by Japanese invest-
ment in the Maquiladora program, where the majority of Japanese
capital in Mexico has been invested.2 59 The benefits of the Maqui-
ladora program to the Japanese, are that a Maquiladora can have
100 percent foreign ownership, preferential treatment is given in the
American market, and Maquiladoras can be geared to service the
American market.260 Additionally, the Japanese have more confi-
dence in Maquiladora investment than in direct investment through
the Regulations because Japan does not yet view the Regulations as
a solid or permanent legal investment apparatus. However, Japan
255. Szekely, When Two Paths Are Better, L.A. Times, Apr. 6, 1990, at B7, col.
4.
256. Moffett, supra note 21, at A8.
257. Larmer, Mexico Looks to Asia for Economic Boost, Christian Science Moni-
tor, Aug. 8, 1989, at 1, col. 1; Trilateral Report Notes Progress, Potential in Latin
America and Mexico, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 595 (Apr. 25, 1990).
258. The authors base this determination on personal experience with Japanese
investors in various geographic regions.
259. Larmer, supra note 257, at 2, col. 3.
260. See supra pp. 33-36.
would most likely increase its presence in Mexico in methods other
than the Maquiladoras if certain conditions were met.
The most basic of these conditions, certainty, is something that the
Japanese have rarely found in their incursions into Mexico. For the
Japanese, it is harder to predict Mexico's "manana," '26' than earth-
quakes. Uncertainty surfaces in part, as in many other aspects of
Mexican daily life, because of the way in which Mexico modified it's
Foreign Investment Law through the Regulations. As stated by the
President of the Industrial Bank of Japan, the Regulations did not
gain approval through the strong leftist factions of the Mexican Con-
gress, and hence, the non-congressionally approved Regulations do
not "give sufficient 'certainty to' . . bosses in Japan". 262
The Japanese most likely, will not invest in Mexico through the
Regulations until Mexico demonstrates that it is serious and will not
capriciously change the law. Again, Japan lacks confidence that
Mexico's foreign investment policy will remain unchanged, and thus
Japan is reluctant to invest in Mexico. Although Japan is reluctant
to invest directly in Mexico (i.e., through the Regulations) it will
invest in Mexico if it has substantial assurances of access to the
United States market. 63 The FTA would provide these assurances.
Through the FTA, Mexican products financed by Japanese capital
would have access to the United States market. Consequently, as the
FTA is enacted, Japan will increase investment in Mexico; thus,
with the FTA, Mexico's missing element of "certainty" appears.
Absent the FTA, it is unlikely that much Japanese capital, outside
the Maquiladora industry, would be committed to Mexico in the
near future.264 Instead, Japan may decide to invest in other geo-
graphic areas closer to home, such as the Soviet Union,26 5 China, 66
Germany, or the new East-European markets of Czechoslovakia, and
Hungary.6 7
261. Manana in this sense means a "tomorrow attitude" or "no one knows exactly
when but sometime in the, future". The word is used quite often by Mexicans in this
context, though literally translated manana means "tomorrow". See generally A. RID-
ING, supra note 24, at 6.
262. Moffett, supra note 21.
263. Larmer, supra note 257, at 1, col. 1.; Pastor, supra note 199.
264. See Yasaku, Free Trade Agreement: Consequences of the Maquiladora, Nik-
kei Economic Journal, Dec. 14, 1990, at 9 (translated from Japanese).
265. When Bears Sniff Chrysanthemums, ECONOMIST, Sep. 15, 1990, at 16.
266. McGregor, Japan Manufacturers Flock to Manchuria, Wall St. J., Dec. 13,
1990, at All, col. 1.
267. Japanese Business in Eastern Europe; Window Shopping, ECONIOMIST, Feb.
17, 1990, at 75.
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VII. THE SCOPE AND APPLICATION OF THE FTA
Given the historical, geographical, sociological, and political cir-
cumstances shared by the United States and Mexico, it is most likely
that a United States/Mexico free trade agreement will not be
framed to deal exclusively with trade and direct economic issues. A
classical FTA would focus on the gradual and comprehensive elimi-
nation of trade barriers for goods and services. However, in negotiat-
ing an FTA between Mexico and the United States, additional con-
siderations beyond those normally contained in an orthodox accord
must be addressed." 8 These other considerations included immigra-
tion, investment, and labor.6 9 The following is a brief presentation
of the major issues.
For Mexico, it will be important to negotiate an FTA with the
ultimate goal of increasing foreign investment,70 yet, Mexico will
attempt to protect its culture and sovereignty. The United States, on
the other hand, would try to establish concrete regulations on intel-
lectual property rights, investment in strategic areas, as well as ac-
cess to Mexico's oil, agriculture, and financial markets. 1 Moreover,
entrance to service type industries, such as insurance banking, and
securities will definitely be sought by United States negotiators. 27 2
However, the production of manufactured goods and agricultural
products will be the most extensively negotiated issues of the FTA.
This is mostly due to concerns of labor and union leaders and agri-
cultural producers. American labor and union leaders state that the
FTA will take jobs and lower wages for Americans by giving em-
ployment to Mexicans.7 Agricultural concerns, among others, in-
268. See Baker & Bialos, U.S.-Mexico Trade Talks: A Preview, 20 ABA Lawyers
6 (Win. 1991); Lawrence, Free Trade Agreement Between the U.S. and Mexico May
Cover Even More, San Diego Union, Nov. 23, 1990, at Bli, col. 1 (Negotiations may
include, inter alia, a social charter, stringent environmental reforms, and illegal drug
trafficking).
269. See Agenda for Bilateral Free Trade Agreement Talks Said to be Wide
Open at this Point, 7 Int'l. Trade Rep. (BNA) 956 (June 27, 1990); see also Border
Businesses Called on to Lead Fight for Fast Track Status for FTA Negotiations, 8 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 354-55 (May 6, 1991).
270. See Agenda for Bilateral Free Trade Agreement, supra note 269, at 956.
271. Miller, Salinas is Eager to Nail Down A Pact, L.A. Times, June 9, 1990, at
A3, col. 4.
272. Hills, Statement by Ambassador Carla Hills, U.S. Trade Representative,
Before the Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate (Feb. 6, 1991) at 6 [hereinafter Hills'
Statement].
273. Key Legislators Urge Bush not to Limit Agenda in FTA Negotiations with
Mexico, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 19 (Jan. 2, 1991). This idea is discussed in more
detail infra notes 278-86 and accompanying text.
clude phasing out subsidies and dealing with the technological diver-
sities among individual farmers and between the nations.2 74 Also,
there exists a conflict regarding one of Mexico's most important nat-
ural resources: oil. Mexican authorities have consistently repeated
that its oil sector will not be part of the FTA. Mexico based this
opposition on Constitutional principles.7
On June 11, 1990, in anticipation to FTA negotiations, both gov-
ernments officially issued a joint communique expressing their inten-
tion to open their countries to free trade, agreeing in principle that
such an agreement should include: a) a gradual elimination of tar-
iffs, b) an elimination or reduction of non-tariff barriers, c) the es-
tablishment of mechanisms that would grant efficient protection to
intellectual property, d) the establishment of fair and fast procedures
to solve controversies, and e) the means to develop and expand the
traffic of goods, services, and investments between the two coun-
tries. 6 Specifically left out of this communique were the more diffi-
cult areas of agriculture, labor, and oil. These more difficult and
emotional issues will need to be addressed at the negotiating table.
VIII. OBSTACLES TO THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
To minimize the conflicts and pains that a comprehensive agree-
ment implicitly produces, the FTA would necessarily have to evolve
over a period of time through negotiation. Throughout negotiations,
the pact will most likely be modified with political compromises
made, until it is acceptable to most facets of both countries. Conse-
quently, the agreement would not be completely "free" because it is
highly likely that each government will protect some industries. 277
However, before an agreement is finalized, there are certain or-
ganized forces on both sides (the United States and Canada on one
and Mexico on the other) which will strongly oppose the FTA, or
274. Border Business Called on to Lead Fight for Fast-Track Status for FTA
Negotiations, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 356-57 (Mar. 6, 1991). This is discussed in
more detail infra notes 284-95 and accompanying text.
275. See CONST. art. 27, para. 4; see also Mexico Repeats Insistence that Oil
Sector Will not be Part of FTA Negotiating Agenda, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 201
(Feb. 6, 1991). Interestingly, when article 27 of the Mexican Constitution was enacted in
1917, its text, denying ownership right of oil to foreigners, caused such a stir that war
between the United States and Mexico almost broke out. See L. Meyer, supra note 26,
at 183-90. Thus, any foreigner who ever owned oil rights in Mexico acquired those rights
before the 1917 Constitution was adopted and lost any such rights in 1938 when Mex-
ico's oil industry was nationalized. For information regarding the nationalization of Mex-
ico's oil industry in 1938 see supra note 85 and accompanying text.
276. SPECIAL FORM No. 1, supra note 41, at 1-5.
277. See generally the Free Trade Agreement between the United States and Can-
ada, supra note 4. Currently, there are still sectors of commerce between the U.S. and
Canada which are not completely open to free trade. Logically, with the U.S./Mexican
FTA some trade barriers will exist, especially when the agreement is first implemented.
Likely sectors include textiles and agriculture.
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will at least try to exclude areas from the agreement which could
specifically affect them. These groups (labor unions, special interests,
etc.) will try to delay the agreement, hoping for concessions from the
other side, or for wanes in the agreement's political popularity.
A. American Labor and Agriculture
Logically, from the American perspective, manufacturing and ag-
riculture are the most important areas which will be affected by the
agreement. For example, the AFL-CIO argues that the FTA would
compel many American firms to move south, thus affecting Ameri-
can jobs and the economy. 8 In response to this argument, it must
be remembered that United States labor intensive industries have al-
ready pursued inexpensive labor in other countries for some time.27 9
If United States industries are going to continue to pursue inexpen-
sive foreign labor, it would be most beneficial for American firms to
seek this labor in Mexico. Due to global changes, certain jobs cannot
remain in the United States and be competitive. 2 0 These jobs can
either go to. Asia or Mexico. Mexico's a better alternative from an
American perspective because seventy percent of its imports come
from the United states and by creating more and better jobs for
Mexico, United States' exports will increase.28 If American firms
were to move to the low cost Asian labor markets, there is no guar-
antee that the markets there would be accessible to American goods,
and freight costs to bring the items back to the United States would
be much greater than if shipped from Mexico. For the most part,
these are the same benefits that the successful Maquiladora program
offers. 2 Furthermore, the movement of American industrial plants
to Mexico would eventually anchor Mexican workers to their cities;
thus, preventing them from migrating to the north,283 which will in-
directly assist the maintenance of higher United States wages and
will stem immigration to the United States. Additionally, capitaliz-
ing on inexpensive Mexican labor will reduce the costs of goods
278. American Survey, From The Yukon To The Yukatan, ECONOMIST, June 16,
1990, at 21.
279. Markside & Berg, Manufacturing Offshore Is Bad Business, 88 HARV. Bus.
REV. 113, 115 (1988).
280. Experience Learned from U.S.-Canada FTA Will Help Talks with Mexico,
Official Says, 8 Int'l. Trade Rep. (BNA) 122 (Jan. 23, 1991); see supra notes 226-230
and accompanying text and supra pps 35-36.
281. Id.
282. See supra pps 35-36.
283. J. WANNISKI, supra note 44, at 146.
which are brought to the United States market for consumers.
Although Mexico is already one of the largest markets for Ameri-
can agricultural products,284 the creation of a trade agreement may
create opportunities for Mexican vegetables, grains, and fruits to
compete in the United States market. American agriculture will
most likely attempt to get safeguards in the agreement to prevent
Mexican access to United States markets. Without such safeguards,
arguably, American agriculture would suffer. However, several fac-
tors may justify the rejection of such safeguards. First, because of
the tremendous growth of the Mexican population and the United
States' new apparent ability to freely export to a more affluent Mex-
ico under the FTA,285 United States agricultural concerns caused by
Mexican access to the United States market should be tempered
considerably. Second, if American agricultural firms begin to pro-
duce in Mexico, they will reduce their labor costs, which will im-
prove their competitiveness,288 and thus, their market share in other
export markets. Finally, the average American consumer will benefit
from lower produce prices, as well as a greater variety of produce.
B. Mexican Labor and Agriculture
From a Mexican perspective the enigmatic problems of land and
labor will be obstacles to an FTA. The provisions of the Mexican
Constitution concerning land will be a significant obstacle for the
agreement. The Mexican Constitution, through a mechanism called
the "ejido", 287 attempted to abolish the exploitation of peasants by
owners of large pieces of agricultural land. The ejido concept divided
huge single owner properties in favor of peasants. The Constitution,
to a large degree, prohibits any form of agricultural land tenure
other than the ejido, and it bans foreign ownership in ejidos. 28
The Mexican government grants ejido land to a community of
farmers. These grants have been used by the P.R.I., the incumbent
political party since the 1917 Constitution, to cultivate votes .28  The
ejido land is inalienable, nontransferable, and nonattachable. 290 Be-
cause half of Mexico's arable land is ejido,291 these characteristics of
284. Hills' Statement, supra note 272, at 4.
285. J. WANNISKI, supra note 44, at 146.
286. Mexican Farm Trade May Move On 2-Way Street, L.A. Times, Feb. 6,
1989, at V1, col. 1.
287. CONST., supra note 65, at art. 27, § VII, VIII.
288. Id. at art. 27, VII. By specification in this article, ejido rights only attach to
centers of population which "by law or in fact, possess a 'communal' status." As inter-
preted, this status only applies to Native Mexicans.
289. See Mexico, The New Model Debtor, supra note 31, at 87.
290. CoNsT., supra note 65, at ch. I, art.27.
291. Oranday, Elements to Discuss about the Ejido in Mexico (Elementos para ia
discusion sobre el ejido en Mexico), 40 FOREIGN COMMERCE (COMERCIo EXTERIOR),
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the ejidos have caused nationwide agricultural production to de-
cline.2 92 Because of the uncertainty in ownership, 293 the lack of
proper insurance, the insufficient credit available to farmers, and the
precarious land distribution system, Mexican agricultural production
has suffered, and thus in its current state does not have much export
capacity. Together, all of these obstacles have discouraged agricul-
tural investment and have thrust farmers into vast urban
concentrations.
To have an effective FTA, changes would have to be made in the
ejido. However, as noted, the ejido concept is strictly protected by
the Constitution294 and cannot be easily changed.2 95 Moreover, at-
tempting to change the ejido provision of the Mexican Constitution
to allow foreign participation would have dramatic political
overtones.
Ejido ownership is more than just a real estate ownership system,
and it cannot be cast aside as only affecting land. Changes in the
ejido system would cause serious political and social unrest. The
ejido is one of the major issues for which more than one million
Mexicans died in the Mexican Revolution. Therefore, President Sali-
nas will face serious political risk if he modifies this institution with-
out the proper safeguards or the right circumstances. Although the
ejido must be changed to be efficient, meddling with this institution
has always been politically taboo. However, because of Mexico's
need for foreign capital and modern farming techniques, it would not
be surprising to see a gradual modification of ejido law as the FTA
comes closer to fruition. President Salinas and his political party, the
P.R.I., may be able to convince Mexicans that the benefits of foreign
capital and technology outweighs the rationale for the ejido system.
Labor, the other major Mexican concern, is governed by Article
123 of the Constitution. Article 123 was a reaction against tyranni-
cal employers and was designed to counter balance the power of cap-
830, 842 (Sep. 1990).
292. Knochenbauer, The Modernization of Agriculture in Mexico (La moderniza-
cion del agro en Mexico), 40 FOREIGN COMMERCE (COMERcIo EXTERIOR) 830, 832
(Sep. 1990).
293. Loss of ownership rights is a viable fear to farmers. They are often reluctant
to invest time and money in ejido land, fearing that it might be taken from them by the
government through an eminent domain type procedure in favor of another farmer or
petitioner. This uncertainty has kept land from being productive because farmers and
investors have been unwilling to work land that could be taken from them.
294. Mexico, The New Model Debtor, supra note 31, at 87.
295. See Rohter, supra note 143.
ital.298 In 1917, Article 123 was enacted to change the abhorrent
working conditions that existed at that time. However, from a mod-
ern perspective, Mexican companies are at an acute international
competitive disadvantage because to some degree, Article 123 hin-
ders productivity and places cumbersome restrictions upon capital
and labor." 7
To increase national productivity, and thus to be more competitive
internationally, Article 123 must also be reformed. Consequently,
the President must revoke some of the rights which labor now en-
joys. 2918 However, any reform of Article 123 will run a risk, similar to
the changing of the ejido law, by upsetting long established constitu-
tional provisions which were paid for by the deaths of many Mexi-
cans; such changes will not be accepted without fervent opposition.
The inextricable problems of land and labor will not be an abso-
lute bar to a free trade agreement. However, if these problems are
not solved before signing, they will greatly interfere with the success
of the agreement. The Salinas administration has recognized that if
these problems are not resolved, they will deter the influx of foreign
investment, and will thwart Mexico's ultimate objectives of free
trade. However, if Salinas drastically alters the protected issues of
land and labor he may risk the loss of political popularity, as well as
grave political unrest.
C. Mexico's Political Obstacles to the FTA
President Salinas' political party, the P.R.I., has widely identified
with the historical and popular issues of land and labor. Yet, the
party's recurrent efforts to manipulate votes in elections has recently
bolstered the popularity of opposing political parties.299 An emerging
dilemma for the P.R.I. and Salinas, is that to fully and effectively
implement the FTA, they will need to at least partially sacrifice their
sacred cows (land and labor); both issues upon which P.R.I. has
based the legitimacy of its power since the Mexican Revolution.
Without the ability to rally voters around the emotional and tradi-
296. B. Trueba & J. Trueba, FEDERAL LABOR LAW (LEY FEDERAL DEL TRABAJO)
XX, XXI (1990) at points 2, 3, 5.
297. For a more detailed discussion on the restrictions imposed by Article 123, see
supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
298. Based on the authors' personal opinions, the rights most likely to be abrogated
will concern mandatory profit sharing (which is guaranteed to all workers under Article
123 of the Mexican Constitution) as well as the unions' liberal rights to strike. See
CONST. at art. 123, frac. IX, XVII, XVIII. Presently, the P.R.I.'s policy is to weaken
unions to make business more efficient. See Silver, Mexico Has Its Own Reform Move-
ment, San Diego Union, Oct. 21, 1990, at C5, col. 1.
299. S. Gomez, It's Difficult to Lose: The Official Party in the 1988 Election (La
Dificultad de Perder: El Partido Oficial en la Cayuntura de 1988), MEXICAN SOCIOL-
OGY JOURNAL (REVISTA MEXICANA DE SOCIOLOGIA) 242 (OcT.-DEc. 1989).
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tional appeal of the land and labor issues (the anti foreigner and
revolutionary issues), the P.R.I. may have little to offer voters, and
thus fail to stay in power, In the 1991 midterm elections, the FTA
will be a major issue.300 Salinas will have to convince the Mexican
people that the P.R.I.'s changed economic policies are producing
beneficial results that exceed the appeal of the emotional issues of
land and labor. Salinas will also have to convince the voters that the
benefits from the FTA and the opening of Mexico's economy will
compensate for any security that is lost by the compromise of consti-
tutional land and labor protection; indeed, P.R.I.'s future may de-
pend on it.
If foreign investment does not increase significantly in the near
future, thereby improving Mexico's economic climate, the P.R.I. will
surely face tremendous problems in the next presidential election in
1994.301 Over optimistic expectations about the FTA may help em-
power a new political party if the voters believe that the P.R.I. has
not fulfilled its promises, or has not chosen the right course. If an-
other political party does come to power, there is no guarantee that
it would honor the Regulations and the FTA: a position which could
be harmful to Mexico and to the United States.
With these political obstacles in mind, President Salinas must
push for a rapid acceptance of the FTA, so that it is producing fruits
at the time of the next presidential election. Accordingly, he has
urged that the FTA be expedited by requesting President Bush, on
August 21, 1990, to have the negotiation done under United States'
Congressional fast track procedures. 0 2 Fast track procedures require
that the treaty be presented directly to Congress in its entirety to be
accepted or rejected. Without.the fast track process each detail of
the agreement would have to pass through Congressional scrutiny
individually. Under United States procedural law, this fast track
process should ensure a final determination on the FTA within two
years.303
In addition to legal and political obstacles to the FTA, there are
those economic and cultural obstacles which are deeply rooted in the
1917 Constitution. Constitutional provisions which were not created
in response to particular historical struggles and events may be
300. Rohter, supra note 238, at D23, col. 1.
301. See Rohter, supra note 143.
302. Mohn, supra note 243, at 4. The Fast Track Procedures are codified at 19
U.S.C. § 2903(b) (1988).
303. Mohn, supra note 243, at 4.
changed relatively easily, as shown by the reprivatization of the
banking industry.3 0 4 However, in contrast, fundamental Constitu-
tional principles like a one term presidency, the anti-religious status
of government, the existence of ejidos, and the worker protection
rules are still considered sacred. It is extremely difficult to change
Constitutional provisions related to these past social struggles. How-
ever, to cope with a changing world and to truly commit to the FTA,
parts of the Constitution must be changed to allow foreigners more
economic access to Mexico. This may be unpopular because of Mex-
ico's strong ties to its historical roots.
Therefore, the P.R.I. must make a difficult decision: either con-
tinue to uphold the original ideals of the Revolution (continued pro-
tection if land and labor) and risk economic disaster, or change its
historical support of these certain constitutional dogmas and risk re-
jection by the voters. The P.R.I. has apparently chosen the latter,
and now it must convince the populace that the changes are abso-
lutely needed and justified due to the emergence of new international
economic realities. The decision to abandon the Constitutional dog-
mas of land and labor is a watershed decision for the P.R.I., and the
P.R.I. must justify this decision to the people if it is to endure. Inter-
national economic realities forced the P.R.I. to embrace the FTA.
Now, the P.R.I. must convince the Mexican people that the funda-
mentals upon which it has traditionally based its power (protecting
land and labor) are no longer the paramount concerns of the coun-
try, and that these fundamental principles have become outdated.
In summary, to ensure the success of an FTA, fundamental Con-
stitutional principles must be compromised. However, the process of
change and adaptation are difficult for Mexico because of its ossified
political system and because of the memories of foreign
interventions.
D. Timing: Why so Fast?
Both Mexico and the United States have strong reasons to hasten
the implementation of the FTA.305 For both sides the pressures are
obviously economic. For the United States quick action is necessary
to hedge against, and to ensure competitiveness with other economic
blocks. 306 For Mexico, the FTA is a decision of destiny. The race
between Mexico and other developing nations for a limited amount
of foreign investment capital is intense.30 7 Without obtaining a share
304. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
305. For a discussion of the rationale for an FTA, see supra text 6-13 and 64-75.
306. Facing Increased International Competition, supra 17, at 122. See also text
at 8-9.
307. See Kaslow, supra note 9.
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of this limited capital, Mexico will be unable to create the one mil-
lion new jobs3"8 it needs each year to employ its growing population.
With the possible future dissolution or eventual ineffectiveness of
GATT,309 a trade vacuum will arise. An FTA between the United
States and Mexico will hedge against this vacuum and should be
able to supply Mexico with the capital and jobs it desperately needs.
Moreover, a western hemisphere common market310 sets the stage
for the region to compete with the European Economic Community
(EEC) and Asia."' By joining with the United States now, Mexico
will already be reaping the benefits of an economic block, while
other western hemisphere nations scramble to join an alliance.
Although both countries have reasons to enter into an FTA
quickly, people are justifiably concerned with the timing of the
agreement. 12 A hastily negotiated agreement could cause inadver-
tent mistakes. These mistakes would cause long lasting and irrepara-
ble harm to the economic and political relationship between the
United States and Mexico, as well as within each nation itself. In
Mexico, even some opponents of the current government do not at-
tack the economic reforms or the FTA; they do criticize, however,
the speed at which it is being negotiated, because important issues
may be mishandled in the haste.31 3 Any resulting give-aways would
be construed by the nationalistic Mexican people not only as negoti-
ating failures, but more importantly as a partial loss of sovereignty,
much like the loss of territory.
IX. CONCLUSION
To many Mexicans, the FTA could be a bitter pill to swallow,
since to be effective it will require the destruction or compromise of
many principles upon which Mexico has staked its identity over the
past three-quarters of a century. However, economic changes and re-
forms in the world, the United States, and in Mexico, have given
308. C. Salinas, supra note 21 at H6563.
309. See Executives Regret Collapse of GATT Negotiations, supra note 252;
Longworth, supra note 5.
310. Truell, supra note 7.
311. Poll Shows U.S. Support for Extension of U.S.-Canada Trade Pact to In-
clude Mexico, 7 Int'l. Trade Rep. (BNA) 848 (June 13, 1991); Facing Increased Inter-
national Competition, supra note 17, at 122.
312. American Survey, From the Yukon To The Yucatan, supra note 278, at 21.
313. C. Cardenas, Misunderstanding Mexico, 78 Foreign Policy 113-30 (Spring,
1990); Rohter, Free Trade Talks with U.S. Set of Debate in Mexico, N.Y. Times, Mar.
29, 1990, at D23, col. 1.
birth to this agreement. Although the FTA will encounter obstacles,
because of strong international and domestic economic pressures, it
is a necessary and natural progression. Far too many serious eco-
nomic problems will result if the agreement is not formed.
The FTA is a consequence of the evolution of world economics.
Born as a defensive weapon to hedge against an emerging trade war
amongst geographical blocks, it may also become the best strategic
tool to advance the United States and Mexico into the next
millennium.
